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Abstract 
 
Human beings constantly deal with an enormous amount of information that 
cannot be processed at once. Given the limited cognitive resources available for 
the processing of incoming information, visual selective attention has the role to 
differentiate between competing stimuli in order to facilitate the processing of 
stimuli that are relevant for adaptive behaviours. 
From an evolutionary perspective, stimuli with emotional content, in particular 
those signalling danger or threat, are very powerful in attracting and holding 
attention even if they are task-irrelevant. Moreover, emotional stimuli get higher 
processing priority compared with other competing stimuli and their access to 
further processing and conscious perception is thought to be automatic, at least 
when sufficient cognitive resources are available. Therefore, avoiding emotional 
stimuli, especially those with negative content, requires a conspicuous amount of 
resources that, if engaged for a prolonged period of time in a highly demanding 
cognitive task, they can undergo depletion, and eventually lead to the mental 
fatigue phenomenon.  We propose that the amount of resources specifically 
dedicated to selective attention are also limited, and that they can be depleted 
specifically, and possibly independently, from the resources available for other 
cognitive mechanisms.  
This work was planned in order to directly explore this possibility, assuming that 
the crucial resources necessary to overcome the impact of irrelevant emotional 
distractors are also involved in attentional processing, and – more specifically – in 
the filtering of distracting visual information. We expected that by heavily 
engaging these inhibitory mechanisms, providing conditions of heavy and 
persistent distraction, we would observe phenomena suggesting that they were 
being depleted during the course of the experimental session (i.e. one-hour 
session). 
In a series of visual search experiments, young adult participants had to 
discriminate a target stimulus, while ignoring a task-irrelevant distractor that 
could be present in a portion of trials. According to the aim of our research, in 
order to increase, on the one hand, the attentional load and, on the other, the need 
 
 
to filter out distracting information, task-irrelevant stimuli with emotional content 
were introduced prior to each visual search trial. I then measured performance to 
evaluate the overall impact of emotional stimuli, revealing that while the onset of 
all emotional stimuli affected attentional deployment in the subsequent trial, such 
impact was different according to the valence of the stimuli involved. Analysing 
the efficiency of distractor filtering processes over the experimental session, I 
observed changes in performance suggesting that the attentional resources 
specifically involved during the inhibition of distractors in the visual search task 
could indeed be depleted. By this new approach, in this series of studies I offered 
new evidence relative to the depletion of cognitive resources specific associated 
with selective attention. I demonstrated that these domain-specific resources can 
be depleted in a relatively short period of time (i.e., one-hour session). Moreover, 
I highlighted how emotional activation can either enhance or impair cognitive 
performance depending on the emotional valence of the stimuli involved, with 
negative emotions leading to detrimental effects and positive emotions leading to 
restorative effects on cognitive resources. I also provided evidence on the fact that 
under condition of high load on attentional processing, the active engagement of 
top-down behavioural control may limit, or even abolish, the detrimental effects 
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Visual Selective Attention  
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1.1 Visual selective attention 
In everyday life, we are constantly exposed to a huge amount of sensory 
information derived from external and internal sources. Nevertheless, at any given 
moment only a small part of the incoming information can reach awareness and 
play a role in guiding behaviour, because our cognitive system has limited 
processing resources. At all times the available stimuli compete with each other in 
order to gain access for further processing. In this respect selective attention is the 
gateway to cognition: it allows us to focus on relevant sensory information while 
filtering out the irrelevant stimuli. Specifically, visual selective attention operates 
such filtering with respect to stimuli in the visual domain (Chelazzi et al., 2011; 
Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Reynolds & Chelazzi, 2004). 
But how exactly does visual selective attention “decide” which stimuli should be 
selected, and which should be ignored? 
 
1.2 Bottom-up and top-down: two attentional control mechanisms 
William James (1980) first delineated two varieties of attention over a century ago 
(James, 1980): one being passive, involuntary and reflexive and the other one 
active and voluntary.  
Nowadays, we refer to these as bottom-up and top-down or the less metaphorical 
stimulus-driven or goal-driven. Bottom-up (or exogenous) attention is referred to 
an externally induced process in which attentional control is driven by highly 
noticeable featural properties of stimuli that are present in the environment (e.g., 
Jonides, 1981; Jonides & Yantis, 1988; Theeuwes, 1991a, 1992, 1994, 2004; 
Yantis, 1993; Yantis & Jonides, 1984). 
Traditionally, bottom-up selection is associated with stimuli whose salience is 
such that they “pop-out” from their background, because their basic features (e.g., 
colour, luminance or orientation) are very different from those of other 
surrounding objects. Typically, the processing of pop-out stimuli can occur “in 
parallel”, without the need of examining every element in the scene which 





evidence fuelled the theoretical approach adopted by the Feature Integration 
Theory, which claimed that the apparently effortless attentional processing of 
pop-out stimuli relies on the fact that simple stimulus features such as colour, 
luminance and orientation are represented in different areas at the early stage of 
cortical visual processing, and therefore can be processed in parallel, 
independently from one another (Treisman & Gelade, 1980).  
Under certain circumstances, stimuli whose features render them capable of 
triggering bottom-up attentional control may act as strong distractors, if they are 
not relevant for the participants’ current goals, drawing attention away from other 
stimuli which are instead task-relevant. When objects or events gain priority in 
being processed independently of the volitional goal of the observer one refers to 
this as attentional capture effect (Theeuwes, 1992). 
Recent research has shown that bottom-up selection (and attentional capture) can 
also occur for stimuli that, while bearing no salient low-level features, have a high 
intrinsic value, for instance because in the past their selection has been repeatedly 
associated with rewarding events (Anderson et al., 2011). Moreover, attentional 
capture has also been observed for stimuli that are maintained in working 
memory, even if completely irrelevant for the task at hand (Pinto et al., 2005; 
Olivers et al., 2006). 
In contrast, top-down (or endogenous) attention is referred to an internally 
induced process, driven by active volitional selection of stimuli that are relevant 
with respect to a person’s goals, and also implies that, in order to deal with the 
relevant information, attention must be withheld from other irrelevant stimuli 
even if they are salient (Egeth & Yantis, 1997; Connor et al, 2004; Corbetta e 
Shulman, 2002; Itti & Koch, 2001; Carrasco, 2011; Ansorge & Heumann, 2003; 
Bacon & Egeth, 1994; Folk & Remington, 1999; Folk, Remington, & Johnston, 
1992, 1993; Folk, Remington, & Wright, 1994; Gibson & Kelsey, 1998; Lamy, 
Leber, & Egeth, 2004).  
Posner (1980) firstly described top-down selection using an experimental 
procedure called the endogenous cueing paradigm. Participants in each trial 
received a cue suggesting them the likely location of the forthcoming target, 
which required a behavioural response. The cue consisted of a centrally presented 
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arrow that pointed at the location of the upcoming target. Faster reaction times 
and fewer errors were reported when the target appeared at the cued location 
compared to uncued ones. This implied on the one hand that attention had been 
allocated to the cued spatial location, facilitating the processing of targets 
appearing therein; on the other that, when a target appeared where it was not 
expected, attention needed to be shifted from the cued location towards the target 
(Posner, 1980). 
Over the years, a very interesting debate has been going on regarding the way in 
which bottom-up and top-down selection processes may interact in controlling 
attentional deployment. More specifically, the interest has been directed in 
understanding whether the two may truly be independent forms of attentional 
control, or whether one may somehow subserve the other, within a hierarchical 
organization of cognitive processing (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Theeuwes & 
Belopolsky, 2010; Theeuwes & Godijn, 2001; Raushenberger, 2003; Burnham, 
2007). The dichotomy between top-down and bottom-up forms of attentional 
control has been extensively studied by means of experimental paradigms leading 
to attentional capture. 
 
1.3 Attentional capture paradigms 
One of the first authors to investigate systematically attentional control 
mechanisms was Jonides (1981). In his study, he revealed how the allocation of 
visual selective attention in space could be efficiently manipulated by means of a 
spatial precuing paradigm, which involves the presentation of a cue prior to the 
appearance of a target (Fig.1). The target appeared equally often at each location, 
independently of the cue’s location and therefore the cue and the target locations 
coincided at chance level. Jonides observed that when the target appeared at the 
cued location reaction times were faster, thus suggesting that the cue indeed 
captured attention, despite being non-relevant nor predictive of target location 






Figure 1. Sample trial sequence from the Spatial Precuing paradigm.  
 
Another paradigm commonly adopted to investigate attentional capture is the 
irrelevant singleton paradigm, where subjects are asked to respond to a target 
stimulus presented within an array of stimuli, one of which appears abruptly in a 
proportion of trials (Hillstrom & Yantis, 1994; Jonides & Yantis, 1988; J. T. Todd 
& Van Gelder, 1979; S. Todd & Kramer, 1994; Treisman & Gelade, 1980; Yantis 
& Egeth, 1999; Yantis & Hillstrom, 1994; Yantis & Jonides, 1984). Within the 
stimulus set, one item is a singleton, in that it bears properties that are unique with 
respect to the others, but this distinguishing feature is task-irrelevant, in that it is 
randomly associated with target or non-target objects. For instance, Yantis and 
Jonides (1984) (Fig.2) asked participants to search for a prespecified target letter 
(E) among several non-targets (H, S, and R) and to report whether the target was 
present or not. The set size was varying, trial by trial. The search display was 
initially defined by placeholders in the shape of a digital eight (Fig. 2). Later, 
parts of the placeholders were erased so that a letter was created in each of the 
positions previously occupied by the placeholders (non-onset letters). In some 
trials a new letter appeared abruptly (the cue), in a previously unoccupied 
location. In a random fashion, this new letter could be the target (target-onset 
condition), or a non-target letter (target-nononset condition). The authors found 
that in the target onset condition reaction times were not modulated by the set 
size, suggesting that the abruptly appearing letter captured attention, facilitating 
performance when it was the target to be reported. Conversely, in the target absent 
condition and target-nononset condition, the attentional capture effect – due to the 
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presence of the irrelevant onset – increased as a function of set size, reflecting that 
attention was effectively drawn towards the irrelevant onset, which added to the 




Figure 2. Sample trial sequence from the Irrelevant Singleton paradigm.  
 
Later on, the irrelevant singleton paradigm has been revisited by Theeuwes 
(1991a, 1991b, 1992, 2004), who proposed the distractor interference paradigm. 
This task was very similar to the previous one because the attentional cue and 
target appeared simultaneously, within a set of visual stimuli, but it differs from it 
because cue and target locations never coincided. In this task (Fig.3), participants 
were looking for an item, the cue that was a singleton with respect to the 
remaining objects on the screen (i.e., a green circle among green diamonds) and 
had to identify the orientation of a small bar presented inside of it. In the 
distractor-absent condition, all of the items were in the same colour (i.e., green); 
whereas, in the distractor-present condition, one of the non-relevant items was 
red, and was therefore a colour singleton, acting as a salient distractor. It was 
found that reaction times were slower in the distractor-present condition compared 
to the distractor-absent condition, reflecting that upon stimulus display 
presentation attention shifted to the distractor first, slowing reaction times to the 






Figure 3. Sample trial sequence from the Distractor Interference paradigm.  
 
A different methodological perspective was provided by the contingent cueing 
paradigm, based on Folk et al.’s (1992) contingent involuntary orienting 
hypothesis, in which involuntary attentional capture can only be observed, and 
therefore is contingent to, a salient event bearing features that are shared with the 
target, and therefore task-relevant. It is known for example, that when an object is 
maintained in memory, it will capture attention more easily with respect to others, 
even if it is completely irrelevant for the task at hand (Pinto et al., 2005; Olivers, 
2006). According to this theory therefore, observers place target-relevant feature 
information into attentional sets which are maintained in memory and affect 
attentional deployment in order to locate the target (Folk, Leber & Egeth, 2002; 
Folk & Remington, 1996, 1998, 1999; Folk et al., 1993; Folk et al., 1994). In their 
typical experiments (Fig.4), the target (X or = symbols) was a single red item 
among three white items. The red item should, therefore, be included in the 
attentional set, because it was relevant for locating the target. Prior to target onset, 
sets of four dots (one red and three white) were presented around each potential 
target location. According to Folk. et al.’s hypothesis, attention should have been 
captured by the red dot cue, because of the relevance assigned to the “red” colour. 
Indeed, they observed costs in performance when the red dots appeared around a 
location which would not be occupied by the target, reflecting the effect of 
attentional capture associated with the red dots. Moreover, by comparing these 
results to those emerged in a condition in which the target was an onset singleton 
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(an X or =, appearing alone), they did not observe any attentional capture effect, 
presumably because in this case the target-defining property was the “abrupt 
onset” feature, rather than “red color” (Folk, Remington, & Johnston, 1992).  
 
 
Figure 4. Sample trial sequence from the Contingent Cued paradigm.  
 
 






1.4 The attentional capture effect 
The top-down guidance of visual selective attention is thought to imply two main 
processes, both intrinsically involved in information filtering operations: the 
enhanced processing of task-relevant stimuli (target facilitation) and the 
suppression of the competing information (distractor suppression). During target 
facilitation, the contribution of visual selective attention is reflected in faster 
reaction times and fewer error rates in responses to task-relevant information, 
which can be easily observed for instance when targets appear at locations which 
are currently at the focus of attention, with respect to when they appear elsewhere. 
When selection is made more difficult, especially because the target must be 
discriminated against a number of other objects, stimulus filtering operations rely 
heavily also on distractor suppression mechanisms, which suppress the processing 
of non-relevant and potentially distracting information and is then followed by the 
selection of relevant items. The involvement of distractor suppression 
mechanisms typically depends on the degree of interference determined by the 
non-target objects available, and is heavily taxed when non-target stimuli are 
capable of attentional capture, and hence act as powerful distractors. In these 
cases in fact the presence of salient but irrelevant stimuli causes an automatic shift 
of attention that can disrupt performance at the ongoing task, giving rise to the 
well-known attentional capture effect (AC), which leads to slower reaction times 
and greater error rates (Theeuwes, 1992; Folk, Remington, & Johnston, 1992; 
Jonides, 1981; Jonides & Yantis, 1988; Posner, 1980; Posner & Cohen, 1984; 
Posner, Snyder, & Davidson, 1980; Theeuwes, 1992, 1994, 2004; J. T. Todd & 
Van Gelder, 1979; Yantis & Egeth, 1999; Yantis & Jonides, 1984). Thus, AC can 
be considered as a measure of distractibility determined by the automatic 
engagement on bottom-up mechanisms of attentional control (Tommasi et al., 
2015).  
In general, distracting information, even if task-irrelevant, exerts a negative effect 
on attentional processing, which has been assessed in several behavioural (Forster 
& Lavie, 2008; Lavie & Cox, 1997; Theeuwes & Burger, 1998; Theeuwes & 
Godijin, 2002), neuropsychological (Reynold, Chelazzi & Desimone, 1999), and 
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neuroimaging (Kastner, De Weerd, Desimone & Ungerleider, 1998) studies. 
However, whether distractor suppression should be acknowledged as the result of 
mechanisms that are independent from those involved in target selection is still a 
matter of debate. For instance, according to the biased competition account of 
visual selective attention, the allocation of attentional resources depends on a 
mechanism which acts in the visual scene by biasing, on the basis of top-down 
instructions, the competitive interactions arising among multiple stimuli and 
eventually enhancing the relevant one (Desimone, 1998; Desimone & Duncan, 
1995; Reddy et al., 2009). The suppression of distractor information is viewed as 
the direct consequence of such biasing operations, which would therefore be 
responsible for both, facilitatory and suppressive aspects of visual selective 
attention, with no need to foresee the involvement of mechanisms specifically 
responsible for an active filtering of distractors. However, other studies provided 
ample evidence suggesting that attentional mechanisms specifically involved in 
distractor filtering may indeed exist, and play a crucial role in cognition. Many of 
these studies moved from the observation that task performance can improve 
dramatically when, although dealing with a context in which target information is 
surrounded by distracting stimuli, distractors are expected, and therefore it is 
possible to engage a strategic form of cognitive control which would allow to 
suppress the processing of distractors and reduce the relative behavioural costs. 
Hence, two neural mechanisms, within the brain systems supporting selective 
attention, are thought to be mainly involved in dealing with distracting 
information. First, selective attention can cope with distractors by trying to either 
suppress them in the same moment they occur (Awh, Matsukura & Serences, 
2003) or by temporarily enhancing resources assigned to the main task (Carrasco, 
Penepecitalgar, & Eckstein, 2000; Yeshurun & Carrasco, 1998), or both. In these 
cases, the strategies adopted to allow distractor filtering are considered as 
“reactive”, triggered on a moment-to-moment basis by the processing needs posed 
by the current situation. Alternatively, when distraction can be predicted, it might 
be possible to adopt a “preventive”, or “proactive” strategy. Specifically, the 
selective attention might constantly engage part of the processing resources 





Marini and colleagues (2012) demonstrated that, in potentially distracting 
contexts, a filtering mechanism is engaged in order to cope with the forthcoming 
distractors. This mechanism relies on resource-demanding processes and therefore 
while improving performance in trials in which distractors are present, it also 
causes a substantial – but generalized – performance cost, when the expected 
distraction is absent (Marini, Chelazzi, & Maravita, 2012). However, when 
distraction is expected to occur only in a relative minority of the total trials, it 
might be disadvantageous to engage the sustained activation of filtering 
mechanisms, since they weigh heavily on processing resources. Indeed, when 
distraction is relatively unlikely, it might be more convenient to rely on 
mechanisms which filter distractors based on a reactive, rather than strategic, 
processes (Morishima, Okuda, & Sakai, 2010; Marini et al. 2012). In line with 
these hypotheses, it has been demonstrated that the manipulation of distractor 
probability leads to different levels of interference. Specifically, the lower the 
probability of distractors presence, and hence the more likely is the adoption of a 
“reactive” strategy, the higher the inference they engendered, and vice versa 
(Geyer, Muller and Krummenacher, 2008). Furthermore, by analysing task 
performance as a function of distractor presence across consecutive trials, Geyer 
and colleagues (2008) revealed that the interference associated with a distractor in 
the current trial was reduced if the preceding trial also contained a distractor, 
suggesting that such facilitation might be due to the repeated activation of on-line, 
reactive, distractor suppression mechanisms across trials (Geyer et al., 2008). 
Overall therefore, contextual circumstances play an important role in modulating 
attentional settings, crucially depending on whether and how distraction is likely 
to appear.  
Interestingly, many studies have recently shown that the attentional capture effect 
can be modulated by a number of stimulus properties, which are not linked to 
their basic salience. For instance, bottom-up selection can be triggered by the 
emotional value of the stimuli, or the experience gained when interacting with 
them in the past. A growing body of literature has recently revealed that reward 
(or punishment) can exert a strong influence on attention. In particular, specific 
stimuli and spatial locations can acquire increased attentional priority when their 
18 
 
selection has been systematically associated with reward (Della Libera & 
Chelazzi, 2006; 2009; Kristjansson, Sigurjonsdottir, & Driver, 2010; Della Libera 
et al., 2011; Anderson et al., 2011a; 2011b; for a review, see Chelazzi et al., 2013; 
Anderson, 2016). As well, it has been highlighted over the years that emotional 
stimuli exert an important role in controlling attentional deployment, especially 
the unpleasant ones (B. P. Bradley et al., 1997; Hansen & Hansen, 1988). Indeed, 
studies have suggested that stimuli with an emotional value are powerful 
attractors and attention retainers, being able to capture attention automatically, 






















2.1 Emotional stimuli and attention: Two different points of view 
As explained above, selective attention addresses cognitive resources to 
behaviourally relevant stimuli and events, thereby enhancing the processing of 
attended relative to unattended information (Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Treue, 
2003). 
Several studies have demonstrated that emotional stimuli are very powerful in 
attracting attention and can interfere with the overall deployment of attentional 
resources. In fact, emotionally salient stimuli can capture attention, disrupting the 
ongoing task performance, even if they are task-irrelevant, and therefore should 
be ignored (Hodsoll et al., 2011; Yiend, 2010). A large number of studies 
suggested that these stimuli gain priority in order to be processed over other 
objects in the environment because they are very relevant for survival, from an 
evolutionary perspective (Ohman et al., 2001; Vuilleumier et al., 2001; Anderson 
et al., 2003; Phelps et al., 2006). In fact, a bias towards the prioritization of 
emotional stimuli is always likely to occur when there is competition among 
stimuli to access the limited attentional resources of an individual. This bias has 
an adaptive function since it allows humans to efficiently detect these events and 
to rapidly prepare adaptive reactions (Pourtois et al., 2013). This topic represented 
the main focus of interest of many researchers over the recent years, both in 
neuroscience (Vuilleumier, 2005) and psychology (Van Bockstaele et al., 2014; 
Yiend, 2010), and it has been investigated through different experimental 
paradigms. Hindi Attar and colleagues (2010) used pleasant, unpleasant and 
neutral pictures selected from the International Affective Picture System (Lang et 
al., 1999). The images were presented in intact or phase-scrambled form and were 
superimposed by a flickering display in which dots were moving randomly. On 
every trial subjects had to attend to the moving dots and to detect short intervals 
of coherent motion while ignoring the picture in the background. This task 
allowed to record steady-state visual evoked potential (SSVEPs) in the EEG 
signal, in order to obtain a continuous neurophysiological measure of the degree 
to which attentional resources were allocated to the task. Results showed that 





processing compared to neutral ones, reflected in a significant decrease in SSVEP 
amplitudes and target detection rates (Hindi Attar et al., 2010). 
Having established that emotional stimuli capture attention, a very long debate 
has been carried on to establish whether their processing is automatic or whether 
instead, besides being prioritized, it depends on the basis of the available 
attentional resources (Pessoa et al., 2002; Pessoa, 2005; Vuilleumier et al., 2001; 
Vuilleumier, 2005). According to the traditional view, emotional stimuli produce 
interference on the main task because they gain priority access to central 
processing resources and, moreover, this prioritization occurs in an automatic way 
and is not affected by limits in the availability of attentional resources (Morris et 
al. 1999; Ohman et al., 2001; Vuilleumier et al., 2001). Consistent with this view, 
neuroimaging studies have reported that emotional stimuli, with respect to other 
non-emotional stimuli, can be detected and processed with greater efficacy, or 
automatically, giving rise to increased activations in the amygdala, a main brain 
structure associated with emotional processing (Aggleton, 1992; Le Doux, 2000; 
Adolphs et al., 1995; Young et al. 1995; Breiter et al., 1996b; LaBar et al. 1998; 
Morris et al., 1996; Morris et al., 1998a; Morris et al. 1998b; Whalen et al., 
1998b). Accordingly, studies showed that the experimental manipulation of 
attentional resources does not modulate amygdala responsiveness, thus supporting 
the idea that emotional stimuli are processed automatically (Vuilleumier et al. 
2001; Dolan & Vuilleumier, 2003). Whalen and colleagues, using brain imaging 
evidence demonstrated that facial stimuli with emotional expressions can also be 
processed without awareness (Whalen et al., 1998). Using event-related functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), Vuilleumier and colleagues (2001) showed 
an activation of the amygdala for fearful facial expressions that was not 
modulated by attention. Participants performed an attentionally demanding 
matching task for pairs of stimuli which could be houses, either identical or 
different, and faces, either fearful or neutral. Task relevant and irrelevant stimuli 
were shown in each trial, and participants were required to attend either houses or 
faces and to make same/different judgment. Results showed an increased activity 
in the amygdala during the exposure of fearful faces, both when they were 
relevant and when they were irrelevant for the main task. Moreover, also in line 
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with these results, reaction times to houses were slower when fearful faces were 
displayed concurrently as distractors, suggesting that emotional stimuli drained 
cognitive resources from the processing of concurrent task-relevant information 
(Vuilleumier et al., 2001). Anderson and colleagues (2003) also confirmed that 
the response of amygdala to fearful faces was found irrespectively of whether they 
were relevant or not with respect to the task. Specifically, participants were shown 
stimuli which consisted of superimposed pictures of a face (fearful, disgusted or 
neutral) and of a location (a building or an image of exteriors). In each trial faces 
were shown to participants in two task conditions: in the attended condition they 
had to discriminate the gender of the face, and in the unattended condition they 
had to discriminate the building/exteriors type of location. (Anderson et al., 2003). 
A number of studies suggested that such automatic processing of emotional visual 
stimuli may rely on a subcortical pathway, including amygdala, pulvinar, and 
superior colliculus, which seems to be implied in particular during the processing 
of stimuli with a threatening value (Linke et al., 1999; Morris et al., 2001). 
Thus, based on this traditional view, it is possible to hypothesise that emotional 
stimuli may be processed by parallel networks that allow on the one hand the 
automatic and unconscious pre-attentional processing of these stimuli, and on the 
other a conscious type of processing, which affects the allocation of cognitive 
resources (Adolphs, 2004; Anderson & Phelps, 2001; LeDoux, 2000; Pourtois et 
al., 2004; Pourtois et al., 2006; Vuilleumier et al., 2004). 
Studies have shown that at any given moment attentional resources are limited. 
Based on these observations, Lavie (2005) claimed that the degree to which 
irrelevant information is processed (and therefore is allowed also to interfere with 
other ongoing tasks) depends on the perceptual load imposed by the processing of 
the relevant ones, because under normal circumstances the attentional resources 
available will be always used up (Lavie, 2005). In fact, it is only after having 
allocated resources to the relevant stimuli for the current task that any remaining 
resources will be allocated to the irrelevant ones. As a consequence, a high 
perceptual load situation that requires the full engagement of resources for the 
processing of task-relevant stimuli would leave no spare resources for the 





resources would be allowed to – involuntarily – become engaged by task-
irrelevant distractors. This hypothesis has been tested by manipulating the 
attentional load of the main task, in order to spare different levels of brain 
resources to process irrelevant emotional stimuli. Thus, according to the 
traditional view, if emotional stimuli are processed in an automatic way, then they 
should be processed anyways, even if no resources were available, being fully 
required by the main task. 
Based on Lavie's theory, Pessoa and colleagues (2002) criticized the previous 
studies which suggested that the processing of emotional stimuli is automatic and 
unaffected by their task-relevance, because the tasks used were not demanding 
enough to deplete attentional processing resources. In their study these authors 
used a more demanding task, in which fearful, happy or neutral faces were 
displayed at fixation, while oriented bars were shown in the left and right 
periphery. Participants received two conditions: in the attended condition, they 
had to indicate whether the face was male or female, while, on the other hand, in 
the unattended condition they had to indicate whether the orientations of the 
lateral bars were similar or not. The attentional focus hence was always the 
comparison between trials with emotional and non-emotional stimuli. Results 
showed that in the attended condition fearful faces evoked a greater response in 
the network associated with emotional processing, including the amygdala. 
Instead, in the unattended condition this activation was not found. Therefore, they 
concluded that emotional information could be processed only when the task at 
hand is cognitively low-demanding and hence does not require the full 
engagement of attentional resources (Pessoa et al., 2002). 
Singer and colleagues (2007), in line with the suggestion of Pessoa et al. (2002), 
confirmed that the processing of emotional stimuli is dependent on attention, or, 
better, they need the availability of sufficient attentional resources in order to be 
processed. In their experiments, they found that despite the display of emotional 
pictures that were always task-irrelevant, pictures with negative content interfered 
more with task performance compared to neutral ones; however, this interference 
occurred only when there were sufficient attentional resources available for 
picture processing. Hence, they suggested that although the processing of 
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emotional stimuli can be automatic, it also requires attentional resources (Singer 
et al., 2007). 
Nonetheless, the way in which emotional stimuli are processed remains still 
unclear, since the evidence supporting this debate between the competing views is 
based on manipulations that were carried out in different studies, with different 
tasks and experimental requirements. In fact, studies supporting the traditional 
view were mostly characterized by tasks that could be viewed as not challenging 
enough (Anderson et al., 2003; Luo et al.,2010; Vuilleumier et al., 2001), and 
studies from the competing view could have used emotional stimuli which were 
not powerful enough for being automatically prioritized (Mitchell et al., 2007; 
Pessoa, 2005; Pessoa et al., 2002; Pourtois et al., 2006; Silvert et al., 2007). 
 
 
2.2 The negative attention bias 
As described above, emotional stimuli are powerful in attracting and retaining 
attention (Hodsoll et al., 2011; Yend, 2010; Anderson & Phelps, 2001; Keil & 
Ihssen, 2004; Ohman et al., 2001; Zeelenberg et al., 2006) and their attentional 
salience has been investigated by means of different experimental paradigms, 
tapping visual selective attention from different perspectives (the emotional 
Stroop task; Phaf & Khan, 2007; dot-probe task, Mogg et al., 1997; visual search 
task, Ohman et al., 2001; spatial cueing task Fox et al., 2002). Besides 
demonstrating that emotional stimuli are powerful in attracting attention, studies 
have also suggested that there might be a substantial difference in the processing 
associated with stimuli with a different emotional valence (Hindi Attar et al., 
2010, Eastwood et al., 2001; Fox, 2002; Ohman et al., 2001). For instance, when 
subjects are asked to judge the degree of emotional valence of images that are 
equally arousing, negative stimuli receive more extreme values than positive ones 
(Ito et al., 1998). 
According to this assumption, many studies found that negative emotional stimuli 
are processed more thoroughly than neutral picture stimuli, especially under 





for instance demonstrated that task-unrelated negative emotional stimuli 
compared to neutral ones impaired significantly target detection in a vigilance 
task (Helton and Russell, 2011). Pictures with a negative emotional valence are 
also remembered with greater accuracy with respect to stimuli with a neutral 
content (Helton et al., 2009; Kern et al., 2005). Interestingly, it has consistently 
been demonstrated that negative emotional stimuli exert a greater impact on 
information processing not only with respect to neutral information, but also 
compared to stimuli with a positive valence (Baumeister et al., 2001; Cacioppo 
and Gardner, 1999; Taylor, 1991). Following this evidence, studies have tried to 
investigate the nature of this differential effect of negative and positive emotional 
stimuli, in order to reveal whether differences can be found at specific levels of 
cognitive information processing. For instance,  it is plausible that the bias 
towards negative information may occur at processing levels that precede the 
explicit evaluation of the stimulus. Important evidence in this respect was 
provided by Ito and colleagues (1998). In their experiment, participants were 
exposed to positive, negative and neutral pictures while their event-related brain 
potentials (ERPs) were recorded from their EEG signal. The researchers 
highlighted a bias in affective processing towards negative pictures emerging very 
early, presumably reflecting a stage of initial stimulus categorization into valence 
classes (Ito et al., 1998). Specifically, the differentiation between positive and 
negative stimuli occurred extremely rapidly, in less than 120 ms (Smith et al., 
2003). The bias toward negative information has been documented in the 
literature by a large body of studies. Researchers hypothesise that it may have an 
adaptive function, in fact it is thought to be responsible for helping humans to 
safely explore the surrounding environment while avoiding harmful situations 
(Cacioppo et al., 1997; Cacioppo, 1999). Moreover, it is manifested through 
different response systems, such as those related to cognitive, emotional and 
social behaviour (Cacioppo et al., 1999; Mogg et al., 1998; Mogg et al., 2000; 
Peeters et al., 1990; Taylor, 1991). One of the first studies carried out in order to 
understand the attentional bias towards negative stimuli was conducted by Hansen 
and Hansen (1988). In their experiment participants were shown arrays of happy 
faces, comprising a single angry face, or arrays of angry faces, with a single 
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happy face, and they demonstrated that participants were faster in finding the 
angry face among the happy faces than vice-versa. These results were taken as 
evidence reflecting the automaticity with which negative emotional stimuli 
capture attention (Hansen and Hansen, 1988). Later on, other studies have 
suggested however that this attention bias might not be associated with negative 
stimuli in general, but only with threatening faces (Ohman et al., 2001).  
However, several studies have demonstrated not only that negative emotional 
events elicit more rapid and prominent responses than neutral or positive ones 
(Carretié et al., 2000; Dijksterhuis et al., 2003; Armony & Dolan, 2002; Erthal, et 
al., 2005; Pessoa, et al., 2005; Anderson, et al., 2003; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; 
Mogg et al., 2000; Baumeister, et al., 2001; Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999; Taylor, 
1991), but that in order to be detected they need less stimulus input (Carretié et 
al., 2000). One possible reason illustrated by Cacioppo and colleagues (1999) is 
that negative emotional information summons mental and behavioural adjustment, 
whereas positive or neutral information indicates that "we are safe" and therefore, 
does not necessarily modify our approach toward a stimulus. Instead, positive 
emotional information might encourage perseverance with our initial behaviour 
(Cacioppo et al., 1999).  
 
 
2.3 Positive emotional stimuli and attention 
After having focused on studying negative emotional stimuli, more recent 
research has been directed also towards the investigation of attention biases 
towards positive emotional stimuli. In this respect, many studies have investigated 
such biases towards stimuli that have acquired a “positive” value because they 
are, or have been in the past, systematically associated with rewarding 
consequences. So, for instances, attentional biases have been found for drug-
related stimuli in the context of substance abuse, or for food in patients with 
eating disorders (Brignell et al., 2009, Field & Cox., 2008; Franken, 2003; Field et 
al., 2009). In the general population attentional biases for positively valued 





adults, money, self-related information and food stimuli (Lang et al., 2009; Pool 
et al., 2016). Interestingly, attentional biases towards positive stimuli are found 
more easily when the emotional stimuli consist of pictures, rather than words 
(Pool, et al., 2016; Pishyar et al., 2007). Besides describing their general effects 
on attentional processing, more recently, researchers have also discovered that 
positive stimuli portraying natural scenes seem to have a restorative effect on 
cognitive processing, suggesting that the display of such material may be 
beneficial for improving the working of cognitive mechanisms (Berman, et al., 
2008; Berto, 2005; Cimprich & Ronis, 2003; Faber, Taylor, Kuo, & Sullivan, 
2002; Hartig et al., 2003; Tennessen & Cimprich, 1995). On the basis of these 
observations, Kaplan (1995) formulated a new approach for restoring cognitive 
mechanisms and named it the attention restoration theory (ART; Kaplan, 1995, 
2001). Directed attention was identified as the mechanism that is restored by the 
interaction with either nature or natural scenes since natural environments are 
innately fascinating and evoke a type of effortless attention, or fascination, that 
allows directed attention to rest and restore (Kaplan, 1995). Tennessen and 
Cimprich (1995) showed that students who rated their attentional functioning as 
more effective were those who had in the university dormitory natural views from 
their windows (Tennessen and Cimprich, 1995). On the other hand, Berto (2005) 
showed how, after performing a demanding sustained attention test, the cognitive 
functions of participants could be restored also by exposing them to pictures with 
natural scenes. In her experiment participants were shown photographs of 
restorative environments, nonrestorative environments or geometrical patterns. In 
agreement with Kaplan's theory, only subjects exposed to the restorative 
environments improved their performance on the final attention test (Berto, 2005). 
Up to now,  a large body of studies demonstrated that interactions with natural 
environments are more restorative than those with urban environments (Herzog, 
Black, Fountaine, & Knotts, 1997; Herzog, Chen, & Primeau, 2002; Kaplan, 
1995;Kaplan R., 2001; Purcell, Peron, & Berto, 2001;Tennessen & Cimprich, 
1995; Ulrich, 1984; Ulrich et al., 1991) and improve attention and memory 
(Berto, 2005; Cimprich, 1992, 1993; Cimprich & Ronis, 2003; Faber et al., 2002; 





In conclusion, emotional stimuli, even if task-irrelevant, exert a great influence on 
cognitive control and in particular on attentional resources. Although the specific 
effects associated with emotional stimuli with negative or positive valence may 
differ, it is generally acknowledged that given their high intrinsic salience, from 
an evolutionary perspective, emotional stimuli attract and retain attention very 
powerfully. Hence, when they are non-relevant and need to be ignored, attentional 
resources will be recruited in order to allow for their suppression. As a 
consequence, the resources available for the attentional processing of other 











A brief history of limited resources  
30 
 
3.1 Why limited resources? 
In everyday life, the human brain continuously computes representations of the 
sensory world, however, it does not have sufficient processing capacity in order to 
analyse in detail all the information it receives (Tsotsos J.K. et al, 1995, Marois 
and Ivanoff, 2005; Dux et al., 2006). 
Therefore, attentional mechanisms must select, at a relatively early stage of 
information processing, the most important aspects of the environment while 
filtering out the less relevant sensory inputs (James, 1980; Chun, et al. 2011; 
Moran J. & Desimone R., 1985). Under certain circumstances, this targeted 
selection, driven by attentional mechanisms, can give rise to costs in responses to 
behaviourally relevant events, due to the fact that different types of information 
compete for access to a processing bottleneck.  
These limitations are mostly evident in dual-task settings (Welford A.T., 1952; 
Welford A.T., 1980; Pashler et al., 1994). In fact, when people perform two tasks 
at the same time, large costs are usually likely to occur, reflected by larger 
processing time and error rate in both tasks when they are performed concurrently 
as compared to when they are performed in isolation, in single-task situations. 
One of the possible reasons thought to explain why these processing costs emerge 
in situations in which people do two things at once is that central attentional 
resources are limited (Welford A.T., 1952; Welford A.T., 1980; Pashler et al., 
1994). These limitations have been described in terms of a depletion of a pool of 
limited attentional resources that takes place under high attentional demands 
(Kahneman, 1973; Wickens, 2002; Lavie, 2005). 
 
 
3.2 The bottleneck model over the years 
The idea that selective attention subserves a processing bottleneck within the 
cognitive system was first proposed by Broadbent (1958), becoming one of the 
earliest and most influential models of selective attention, the Bottleneck model 





remembered from a speech to which they did not pay attention. Participants, while 
hearing two streams of auditory information through a headphone set, had to 
attend to one source (e.g., the sounds coming from the left) and disregard the 
other (Cherry, 1953). He showed that, when they were asked to report the 
information heard through the unattended channel, participants were only able to 
report changes in its physical properties, such as a drastic change in pitch or tone, 
and they were completely unable to recall the topic or anything related to the 
semantic contents. According to Broadbent’s filter theory, perceptual processing 
is defined by two different stages. The first stage is an automatic process which is 
affected by the physical properties of the stimuli and does not require attention. 
The abstract properties of the stimuli would be processed by the second stage 
which, hypothesized as a serial mechanism, allows only one stream of input at a 
time. Broadbent theorized the existence of a filter between the two stages in order 
to protect the second stage from information overload, thus denying access to 
irrelevant information (Broadbent, 1958).  
This model was criticized by many who did not agree with the strictly sequential 
nature of information processing it implied. In particular, Treisman (1964) 
proposed a new model named the Attenuation model, which consisted of two 
components that rely on each other to function properly. The first component was 
the selective filter, the second one was the dictionary, which symbolized 
information that required very low threshold in order to be recognized. In the 
attenuation model, the selective filter is focused on choosing between competing 
information on the basis of their physical characteristics, such as location, 
intensity or pitch. Instead, the dictionary allows to select between messages based 
on their content. This model proposed that more salient stimuli, such as a louder 
signal, are prioritized because they induce higher levels of activation which are 
closer to the threshold to access awareness. Unattended messages, on the other 
hand, are associated with a decrease in their perceived relevance (Treisman, 
1964). 
A general momentary decrease in the priority for all irrelevant messages can be 
illustrated with an example: a boy is at an airport searching for a friend who just 
arrived, who has a violin and a red hat. The boy will be searching at the gate for 
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all individuals who carry a violin and a red hat, quickly disregarding all the 
others. 
 
Figure 1   A. Broadbent’s Filter Theory (1958)   
                 B. Filter Theory by Deutsch and Deutsch (1963) 
 
 
The debate on the working of the attentional filter was further enriched by a 
model proposed by Deutsch and Deutsch (1963), which claimed that selection 
occurs much later than what Broadbent and Treisman conceived, at least after a 
pattern recognition stage, which included higher-order semantic processing of 
incoming information (Fig.1B). According to this model, all relevant and 
irrelevant information is analysed for meaning, in parallel and without 
interference, in order to select an input for further processing leading to 
awareness. Thus, whether or not an information would be selected is dependent 




3.3 The “pool” of limited resources 
An alternative to the Bottleneck model was the Capacity model with the 
assumption that there is a general limit in the human capacity to perform cognitive 
tasks. This model also assumed that this limited capacity could be allocated 





Knowles (1963) claimed for the first time that the human brain has a pool of 
limited resources (Knowles, 1963). Kahneman (1963) proposed a model in which 
he equated attention with “cognitive effort” and proposed a flexible capacity limit 
that could vary depending on task and an individual’s condition. For instance, if 
the task to perform is high-demanding, a larger amount of resources would be 
invested, otherwise, if the performance is low-demanding the invested amount of 
resources would be lower. When the amount of resources available is not enough 
in order to perform a task, task-performance will be affected (Kahneman, 1963). 
    
Like Kahneman, Norman and Bobrow (1975) have proposed that attention is 
limited in capacity and controlled centrally. However, they claimed that 
performance on attention tasks can only be explained by two types of limitations 
on processing. They theorized a distinction between resources-limited and data-
limited processes. Specifically, performance to some tasks cannot be improved by 
allocating more resources to them because they rely in a fundamental way on the 
quality of the input data. For instance, if the perception of stimulus properties did 
not occur properly, performance will be poor even if more resources were 
available, because the limit is in the data. 
In contrast, resource-limited processes are associated with an improvement in 
performance in parallel with the increase of resources available, until their 
depletion (Norman and Bobrow, 1975).  
Later on, Posner and Boies (1971) proposed a general limit in performing multiple 
tasks at the same time. In fact, they demonstrated that performing two tasks in 
parallel led to a decrease in task-performance in both tasks (Posner and Boies, 
1977). McLeod (1977) observed that this limit could be found only when the two 
tasks were very similar, in fact when performing two different tasks no decreases 
in performance were reported (McLeod, 1977). Allport et al. (1972) for instance 
demonstrated that performing two tasks at once, like playing the piano while 
repeating aloud words, did not lead to a decrease in task-performance (Allport et 
al., 1972). In this respect, Navon and Gopher (1979) proposed a multiple 
resources model of attentional capacity, in which tasks are thought to require a 
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specific amount of resources, and secondary tasks will only interfere in so far as 
they compete for the same resources (Navon and Gopher, 1979). 
Based on these studies, McLeod and Posner (1984) suggested that the human 
brain cannot be envisioned as a single channel of processing, nor relying on one 
single pool of resources. Conversely, they supposed that the human brain is 
defined by multiple cognitive resources which are specifically assigned on 
different forms of information processing (McLeod and Posner, 1984).  
However, neither the single capacity models (Kahneman, Norman and Bobrow) 
nor the multiple capacity models (Allport, Navon and Gopher) seem to provide a 
complete explanation for divided attention. The main problem with single 
capacity models is the failure to account for the effect of similarity in dual-task 
studies. A major weakness of the multiple capacity models is that they do not 
explain how the separate parts of attention work together. Baddeley (1986) 
proposed a synthesis theory which attempted to integrate the most reliable 
features of both approaches. He proposed that attention is controlled by both a 
central limited capacity processor (the central executive) and individual 
processors for different tasks (Baddeley, 1986).  
Altogether, the intrinsic consequence of having limited resources for cognitive 
processing is that they are subject to exhaustion, since what is quantitatively 
limited is destined to undergo a progressive depletion. Up to date, this issue has 














4.1 What is mental fatigue? 
Mental fatigue refers to the subjective feeling that people may experience after 
working for a prolonged period of time on a demanding cognitive activity (Faber 
et al., 2012). In this regard, it is a very common phenomenon in modern everyday 
life which can be experienced by everyone in daily activities such as driving a car 
for a long time or performing a very long-lasting task. Mental fatigue generally 
involves tiredness or even exhaustion, an aversion to continue the task at hand, 
and a decrease in the commitment with the ongoing task (Holding, 1983; Hockey, 
1997; Meijman, 2000). It can be objectively measured in terms of performance 
decrements (Schwid et al., 2003; Lorist et al., 2009), which might be reflected by 
a long term depletion of cognitive resources and a subsequent increase in the 
amount and severity of errors being made. In fact, and more importantly, mentally 
fatigued people often report having a hard time keeping their attention focused 
and that they are easily distracted (Bartlett, 1943). This suggests that mental 
fatigue could be associated with impairment in cognitive and behavioural 
performance (Boksem et al., 2005; Lorist et al. 2005; Van der Linden & Eling, 
2006). Van der Linden and colleagues (2003a, 2003b, 2006) demonstrated that 
people who experienced mental fatigue had difficulties in focusing their attention, 
in behaviour planning and, in front of negative outcomes, difficulties in changing 
adaptively their strategies (Van der Linden et al., 2003a; 2003b; Van der Linden 
et al., 2006). Bocksem et al, (2006) further showed that subjects reported 
compromised capacity in preparing their responses in an adequate way (Bocksem 
et al., 2006). 
 
 
4.2 Mental fatigue and attention 
Several studies have examined the relationship between mental fatigue and 






Van der Linden et al. (2005), for instance, studied the effect of mental fatigue on 
local versus global processing in a 2 hours local-global task, in which subjects 
were shown global patterns formed by conflicting local elements (e.g., a global 
letter H made up of small letters). Fatigued subjects displayed more compromised 
local rather than global shape processing, which, between the two is thought to 
rely more heavily on top-down control (van der Linden et al. 2005). Faber and 
colleagues (2012) investigated whether and how mental fatigue affects selective 
attention in visual processing by examining differences in processing of task-
relevant versus task-irrelevant information. EEG signals, RTs and accuracy were 
recorded from subjects who performed a two hours Eriksen flanker task, in which 
a target letter is shown at the center of a three-items string in which the flanking 
letters may be either neutral or conflicting with the target. Results showed that 
attention was indeed affected by mental fatigue. Participants, in fact, showed 
difficulties in suppressing task-irrelevant information, so that specifically in trials 
in which the flanking letters were conflicting with the target, with increasing time 
on task they tended to show stronger effects of interference, thus reflecting 
decreasing response accuracies (Faber et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, many studies have demonstrated that mental fatigue impairs 
attentive mechanisms in different ways (Boksem et al., 2005, Sarter et al., 2001; 
Summala & Mikkola, 1994; van der Linden et al., 2003; van der Linden et al., 
2006). Boksem and colleagues (2005) examined how mental fatigue affects the 
attentional processes regarding the selection of the relevant information while 
disregarding all the distracting ones. Participants performed a visual attention task 
for three hours without rest. Personal level of fatigue, behavioural responses and 
EEG data were recorded. Results suggested a clear decrement in performance; in 
fact RTs and error rates increased significantly during the 3 hours of task 
performance. Attention-related ERP components in the EEG were as well affected 
by mental fatigue, in fact it seemed that subjects were performing in a more 
stimulus-driven rather than goal-driven way as a reduction in top-down control 
was registered (Boksem et al, 2005). These attentional impairments are the 
consequences of numerous perceptual and cognitive mechanisms. Many other 
studies agreed with Boksem et al., demonstrating that one of the major effects that 
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it is possible to register under fatigue is a weakened top-down-control on more 
automatic cognitive processes (Boksem et al., 2005; Lorist et al., 2000; van der 
Linden et al., 2003). Moreover, as a consequence of reduced top-down 
modulation of behaviour, actions are more likely to ‘escape’ control, which would 
lead to a more stimulus driven and compromised cognitive processing, reflecting 
increased inattentiveness and proneness for errors, which is typical of fatigued 
people (van der Linden et al. 2003). The most common behavioural 
manifestations of these effects are longer RTs, increased error rates, as well as 
difficulty in ignoring distractors. In this regard, particular difficulties in sustained 
attention to a task have been observed when potentially interfering distractors are 
present (Boksem et al. 2005; Lorist et al. 2000). The use of distractors represents 
one way to test attentional control, since it is known that its contribution is crucial 
in order to overcome the potential detrimental effect exerted by distractors (Peers 
& Lawrence, 2009). Nonetheless, there are controversial results on this regard. In 
fact, while an increased distractor effect was found in some fatigue studies 
(Boksem et al., 2005; Landsdown, 2001), other studies failed in finding an 
increased interference due to distraction information under fatigue (Lorist et al., 
2005; Lorist, 2008). Therefore, these results suggest that the ability to ignore 
distractors under fatigue may be moderated also by other task characteristics. In 
fact, Csathò and colleagues (2012) investigated the effects of fatigue in distraction 
processing with varying perceptual load associated with the processing of the 
task-relevant target. Participants performed the Eriksen flanker task, as described 
above, for 2.5 hours without rest. Target letters were presented at three different 
perceptual load conditions, which differed with respect to the number of items 
shown in a central stimulus array together with the target: the higher the number 
of non-relevant items, the higher the cognitive load. Moreover, a peripheral 
distractor letter was also shown, which could be either congruent, incongruent or 
neutral with respect to the task relevant item, shown within the central stimulus 
array. With increasing time on task, the results showed an improvement in 
responses during the first part of the session, followed by a clear deterioration in 
performance over time. The detrimental effect of fatigue was registered 





distraction filtering, they found that it was affected by fatigue at very low 
perceptual load, but not in the medium or high load conditions, adding important 
evidence to the literature on how cognitive processes are affected by mental 
fatigue (Csathò et al., 2012).  
In general, therefore, it could be easy to conclude that mental fatigue is the direct 
result of working for a prolonged period of time: the longer time is spent on a 
cognitive demanding task, the more mental fatigue will be experienced. However, 
studies showed that this is not the case. In fact, while mental fatigue can occur 
also after a relatively short period of working (Sparks et al. 1997; Park et al., 
2001), working for a prolonged periods of time does not systematically lead to 
mental fatigue, for instance when the rewards of working are perceived as high 
(Siegrist et al., 1997; Van der Hulst and Geaurts, 2001).  
 
 
4.3 Motivational decline: can it really lead to mental fatigue? 
Given that mental fatigue can be strongly affected by motivational factors, some 
researchers have claimed that mental fatigue is a complex state that involves 
crucially changes in motivation and mood (van der Linden, 2010). The feeling of 
fatigue may result from the subconscious analysis of costs and benefits associated 
with activities to expend or conserve energy (Tops et al, 2004; Boksem et al., 
2006). In other words, when the potential rewards for performance are high, 
people are motivated in engaging or in continuing ongoing activities, even when 
they require an effort. Conversely, when the perceived energetical costs of task 
performance exceed the motivation in obtaining reward, the present activity may 
be abandoned, in order perhaps to engage in another potentially more rewarding 
activity.  
Further studies, however, suggested that the relationship between motivation and 
mental fatigue might not be so systematic. Gergelyfi et colleagues (2015), for 
instance, collected various neural, autonomic, psychometric and behavioural 
signatures of mental fatigue and motivation from participants who had performed 
a demanding cognitive task for two hours. Results showed that while a 
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motivational decline can occur, causing a progressive disengagement from the 
task, it cannot be considered as a causal factor in the development of mental 
fatigue. In fact, an alteration of task engagement alone could not explain mental 
fatigue, which instead seemed to be the direct consequence of a decrease in 







































5.1 What is ego depletion? 
As in mental fatigue, in everyday life it is possible to observe another 
phenomenon that relies as well on the exhaustion of a pool of limited resources. 
People are used to deal daily with stressful situations that require them to regulate 
their thoughts, their behaviours as well as their emotions. Self-regulation is an 
important key to successful human functioning and behaviour. Studies on self-
regulatory failures suggested that self-control relies on a pool of limited resources 
(Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996); if temporarily depleted, this might impair the 
ability in regulating other seemingly unrelated domains (Vohs & Heatherton, 
2000; Richeson & Shelton, 2003; Gailliot et al., 2007; Hagger et al., 2010). This 
is what the limited-resources model, or the strength model of self-regulation of 
Baumeister & Heatherton (Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996), affirmed. Studies 
have shown that following a low-resources availability in self-control, an increase 
of maladaptive behaviours can be observed (Muraven et al., 2002; Muraven et al., 
2005; Stucke & Baumeister, 2006). Importantly, this state of diminished internal 
resources reduced the efficiency of executive functions, leading to an enhanced 
likelihood of self-regulatory failure which was defined by Baumeister et al. (2009) 
as “ego depletion” (Baumeister et al., 2009).  
 
5.2 Ego depletion and emotion regulation: same pool of resources? 
Many studies highlighted the connection between emotion regulation and self-
regulation. These two forms of regulation, which have been traditionally explored 
within different fields of research, seemed to rely on the same limited resources. 
In fact, one of the most common techniques used in order to lead to the depletion 
of self-regulatory resources is to engage participants in an emotional inhibition 
task (Baumeister et al., 1998; Muraven et al., 1998; Vohs & Heatherton, 2000; 
Schmeichel et al., 2003; Gailliot et al., 2007). Accordingly, it has been 
demonstrated that following the effort to inhibit their emotions during an 
emotionally provocative film, participants showed subsequent difficulties in 





different domain, such as avoiding inviting food (Vohs and Heatherton, 2000) or 
solving very difficult anagrams (Baumeister et al. 1998). These results might also 
point in the opposite direction, suggesting that being engaged in an effortful self-
regulation can subsequently cause emotional dysregulation. In this line, Muraven 
et al. (1998), with the first of a series of experiments, demonstrated that 
participants who completed a thoughts-suppression task were subsequently less 
successful in inhibiting their emotions compared to control subjects (Muraven et 
al., 1998). Likewise, Schmeichel (2007) demonstrated that using a complex 
working memory task it was possible to induce self-regulatory depletion that led 
to failures in emotion regulation in a task which required participants to suppress 
the facial expression of emotion while viewing a highly aversive video segment 
(Schmeichel, 2007). Importantly, according to both studies, the effect of self-
regulation exerted on emotion regulation was not due to non-specific changes in 
mood caused by the depletion task itself (Muraven et al., 1998; Schmeichel, 
2007). Thus, being engaged in effortful self-regulation might impair the 
subsequent attempts to exert emotion regulation. Moreover, and more 
importantly, Wagner & Heatherton (2013) used functional neuroimaging in order 
to investigate the effects of being involved in effortful self-regulation on the 
subsequent neural responses to emotional material. They indeed demonstrated that 
consuming self-regulatory resources led to an exaggerated neural response to 
emotional material, specifically for stimuli with negative valence. Moreover, they 
highlighted a consequent failure in recruiting prefrontal regions involved in top-
down emotion regulation (Wagner & Heatherton, 2013). Taken together, all the 
above results offer clear evidence that emotion regulation draws on the same pool 
of limited resources that are involved in other forms of self-regulation and can be 
impaired after the depletion of these resources. 
 
5.3 Ego depletion and cognition 
Executive functions are the cognitive processes crucially engaged in successful 
self-control (Hofmann et al., 2012). In fact, the exertion of self-control is required 
in order to initiate cognitive processing and focus attention on the current task 
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while inhibiting distractions. Executive functions have a key role in inhibiting 
attentional shifts toward distractors, in updating relevant information in working 
memory and also in shifting between tasks (Hofmann et al., 2012; Miyake et al., 
2000). Although it is still unclear which mechanisms underlie the ego-depletion 
effect, it has now been widely demonstrated that ego-depletion affects negatively 
cognitive task performance. In fact, studies have demonstrated that individuals in 
a state of ego depletion failed more easily in solving anagrams tasks (Baumeister 
et al., 1998; Muraven et al., 1998). Moreover, ego depletion has also been found 
to worsen performance in working memory (Schmeichel, 2007) and mental 
arithmetic tasks (Hagger et al. 2010). Students in a state of ego-depletion had 
fewer mental capacities available to keep their attention focused on information 
stored in working memory, and on the online processing of mathematical 
information, while suppressing simultaneously distracting thoughts or emotions 
(Bertrams et al., 2015; Bertrams et al., 2013). In order to study whether decreases 
in task performance were dependent on ego-depletion effects, Lindner et al. 
(2017) introduced an ecologically valid computer-based session, which allowed to 
test the interplay between trait self-control and ego depletion (Imhoff et al., 2014; 
Gillebaart et al., 2015). They found that a personality trait associated with self-
control was positively correlated to the effort that individuals put in solving the 
task. Participants with higher levels of self-control seemed to deplete their self-
control resources at a higher pace, supposedly because of their more intense use of 
mental capacities in order to control attention and process information. They 
provided evidence that self-control decline over time and ego depletion is indeed a 
phenomenon that can be easily experienced in daily life (Lindner et al., 2017).  
 
 
5.4 Self-control resources: can they be replenished? 
Many studies explored whether self-control resources can be replenished. Sleep 
and rest always help in replenishing self-control resources. In fact, it has been 
demonstrated that well-rested people have better self-control (Baumeister et al., 





involved in the replenishment of self-control resources. Tice, Dale and Baumeister 
(2000) conducted studies in which participants were engaged in two different acts 
of self-control. In a between-subjects design, some of them received an induction 
of positive mood, the remaining were induced to perceive a negative mood. 
Results reflected that the positive mood group showed less evidence of ego 
depletion, suggesting that this affective state could counteract the depleting effect 
due to the resource-demanding task (Tice et al., 2000). Similar results were 
obtained also by Tice et al. (2007), demonstrating again that inducing positive 
emotions, as well as a positive mood, are helpful in counteracting the effect of ego 
depletion (Tice et al., 2007). Moreover, many other beneficial effects of positive 
emotions have been proposed to preserve self-regulation resources, increasing 
arousal (Thayer, 1989) and counteracting the physiological effects caused by 
negative emotions (Fredrickson, 2001; Fredrickson & Levenson, 1998; 
Fredrickson et al., 2000). 
Other studies highlighted the importance of motivational factors in this respect. In 
fact, they have demonstrated that increasing the intrinsic motivation to perform a 
task, such as providing monetary or altruistic rewards in return for task 
performance, improved self-regulation (Moller et al., 2006; Muraven et al., 2008; 
Vohs et al., 2012). Furthermore, Muraven et al. (2003) also demonstrated that 
motivation affects the consumption of self-regulation resources. In fact, 
individuals could compensate for a lack of self-control resources with increased 
motivation (Muraven et al., 2003). Thus, the moderating influence that motivation 





5.5 Aim of this work 
Considering the evidence reviewed above, it seems clear that the human brain 
constantly deal with an enormous amount of information that cannot be processed 
at once since it does not have sufficient processing capacity in order to analyse in 
detail all the information it receives (Tsotsos J.K. et al., 1995; Marois and Ivanoff, 
2005; Dux et al., 2006). Given limited processing resources, visual selective 
attention has the role to differentiate between competing stimuli in order to 
facilitate the processing of stimuli that are relevant for adaptive behaviour while 
filtering out the irrelevant ones (Chelazzi et al., 2011; Desimone & Duncan, 1995; 
Raynold & Chelazzi, 2004).  
From an evolutionary perspective, stimuli that signal danger or threat get higher 
processing priority compared with competing stimuli (Carretié et al., 2000; Pessoa 
et al., 2005; Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999). Accordingly, there is evidence that 
emotional stimuli are very powerful in attracting attention  (Ohman et al., 2001; 
Vuilleumier et al., 2001; Anderson et al., 2003; Phelps et al., 2006) and can 
interfere with the overall deployment of attentional resources. Indeed, a bias 
towards the prioritization of emotional stimuli is always likely to occur where 
there is competition among stimuli to access the limited attentional resources of 
an individual (Ohman et al., 2001; Vuilleumier et al., 2001; Anderson et al., 
2003), even if they are task-irrelevant, and therefore should be ignored (Hodsoll et 
al., 2011; Yiend, 2010). In fact, emotional stimuli are processed faster and easily 
gain access to conscious perception, either because they are processed 
automatically (Vuilleumier et al., 2001), or because sufficient cognitive resources 
are available (Pessoa et al., 2002). Thus, avoiding or preventing the processing of 
emotional stimuli requires a conspicuous amount of resources that, if engaged for 
a prolonged period of time and under high-cognitive demanding tasks, can 
undergo depletion, and eventually lead to the very common phenomenon of 
mental fatigue (Faber et al., 2012). The same resources will be drawn from the 
need to exert self-control to perform a sustained task which requires the inhibition 





(Baumeister et al., 1998; Muraven et al., 1998; Vohs & Heartherton, 2000; 
Schmeichel et al., 2003; Gailliot et al, 2007).  
This work was planned with the aim of directly exploring the possibility that the 
resources which are depleted during the inhibition of irrelevant emotional 
distractors are crucially involved in attentional processing, and represent a set of 
limited cognitive resources specifically engaged for the working of visual 
selective attention. Differently from what typically emerges in mental fatigue, we 
expect that such depletion might occur in a short period of time, under conditions 
of very heavy and persistent distraction. This perspective is entirely new, because 
no one has investigated before the depletion of such limited attentional resources.  
We will describe a number of visual selective attention experiments, based on the 
Attentional Capture task, in which subjects had to detect and discriminate a target 
stimulus while ignoring a salient irrelevant distractor which could appear in a 
proportion of trials. Crucially, in order to increase the cognitive taxing and 
therefore the possibility of leading to fatigue, we decide to set a strong pace 
throughout the experimental session, reducing the time interval between the end 
of one trial and the start of the next. Moreover, in order to, on the one hand, 
increase the attentional load and, on the other hand, the distraction information to 
filter out, we introduced in our paradigm the display of irrelevant stimuli with 
emotional content with different valence. Subjects were instructed to focus their 
attention on the main task (and discriminate the target stimulus), while ignoring 
both the emotional image that appeared prior to the task-relevant stimuli, and the 
salient distractor which could appear simultaneously with the target. Importantly, 
the presentation of the emotional images might have also led to an effort to inhibit 
the emotional response that might be elicited by their appearance. Since previous 
experiments proved that inhibiting emotional responses caused a large consume of 
processing resources, by introducing this manipulation, we intended to add a cost 
in attentional processing resources that might impair also the exertion of self-
control. Thus, considering all these variables, we expected a higher and faster 
consume of attentional resources with time on task, and therefore their depletion 
in a very brief period of time (i.e. one hour-session). The dependent variable taken 
in order to measure the depletion of attentional resources was the effect of 
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attentional capture triggered by the salient distractor appearing during target 
display. In line with our assumptions this cost was expected to increase with time 
on task, reflecting the progressively reduced availability of attentional processing 















6.1 Experiment 1 
As detailed in the first Chapters, cognitive resources are limited (Wickens, 1980, 
van der Linden D., et al., 2003; van der Linden D., 2011), so that for instance 
when people attempt to perform two tasks at once their performance will reflect 
costs, such as greater processing time or/and larger error rates, compared to when 
the same tasks are performed one at a time. Moreover, many studies have 
demonstrated that after several hours spent performing a cognitively demanding 
task a state of mental fatigue will occur, which is also associated with an 
impairment of cognitive and behavioural performance. In fact, fatigued people 
often report having a hard time in keeping their attention focused on the ongoing 
task and being easily distracted. Additionally, reduced levels of motivation are 
also observed, with respect to continuing to work on the task at hand, as well as 
difficulties in planning and changing strategies (van der Linden D., et al., 2003; 
van der Linden D., 2011; Meijman T.F., 1997; Faber, et al., 2012). 
Therefore, it is plausible to claim that mental fatigue has a widespread effect on 
the deployment of limited cognitive resources. Mental fatigue however has been 
typically investigated in situations in which subjects are required to perform a 
given task for several consecutive hours. No studies, however, have observed 
effects that can be associated with mental fatigue within one or two-hour sessions. 
In this experiment, our aim was to investigate whether, by heavily engaging visual 
selective attention in a continuous manner, we could observe a depletion of 
cognitive resources specifically dedicated to attentional mechanisms, and 
therefore give rise to a form of “attentional fatigue” within a relatively short 
period of time, i.e., 1 and a half hour..  
To this purpose, we developed a new version of the Attentional Capture (AC) task 
(Theeuwes, 1994), similar to the one introduced by Tommasi, et al. (2015). As 
explained in the previous sections, the AC task is designed to study the exogenous 
capture of attention by allowing performance to be compared across trials with 
and without a salient-task irrelevant distractor (singleton). It is also used in order 
to reflect the competition between the top-down and bottom-up mechanisms of 





the efficacy with which the two systems manage to resist distraction (Attentional 
Capture).  
In our experiment, participants were asked to search for a task relevant item while 
ignoring a salient irrelevant distractor which could appear in a proportion of trials, 
engaging therefore both attentional mechanisms involved in target selection as 
well as others primarily involved in the filtering of distraction (Noonan, M.P., et 
al. 2016). The main task was similar to the one adopted by Tommasi et al. (2015), 
although in order to make it suitable for our current purposes some important 
changes were introduced.  
Crucially, in order to increase the cognitive taxing and therefore the possibility of 
leading to fatigue, we decided to set a strong pace throughout the experimental 
session, reducing the time interval between the end of one trial and the start of the 
next. Moreover, in order to tax specifically attentional processes, we decided to 
increase the attentional load imposed by the task, introducing an additional 
manipulation that should have driven to a faster depletion of attentional resources. 
Specifically, a full-screen image with a variable emotional content was displayed 
prior to the search array. These images were completely task-irrelevant. Despite 
their being irrelevant for the required task, converging evidence suggests that 
emotional stimuli tend to attract or ‘capture’ attention automatically, interfering 
with the ongoing task (Fox et al., 2000; Vuilleumier & Schwartz, 2001a; 
Anderson, 2005  Vuilleumier   Driver,  2007, Verbruggen F., et al., 2007). For 
this reason, these images might have acted as strong distractors, capable of 
reducing the amount of attentional resources available for the upcoming trial. 
Beyond their capacity to capture attention, emotional stimuli are also capable of 
activating the self-regulatory mechanisms that control and modulate emotional 
responses (Muraven et al., 1998; Vohs & Heatherton, 2000; Schmeichel et al., 
2003; Gailliot et al., 2007.). These self-regulatory operations are known to 
consume resources that subsequently appear as depleted. In fact, it has been 
observed that when people override their emotional responses, they are 
subsequently less successful at controlling themselves or responding actively, 
even in a seemingly unrelated sphere of activity, and experience so the so-called 
phenomenon of Ego Depletion (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; 
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Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998; Vohs & Heatherton, 2000, Baumeister, 
2014). Thus, following the evidence reported in the literature, we hypothesized 
that the display of emotional stimuli prior to the task relevant information in each 
trial could represent an ideal way to overload the systems involved in attentional 
processing. Together with the fast pace of the task, and therefore the limited time 
allowed for any rest in between trials, we expected to observe a progressive 
deterioration of attentional performance during the course of the experimental 
session, possibly suggesting the ongoing depletion of attentional resources. 
Differently from a generalized effect of fatigue, which might have nevertheless 
appeared during the session, we expected this phenomenon to be specifically 
attentional in nature, and result for instance in greater costs associated with the 
filtering of salient distractors when they were present together with the to-be-
discriminated target.  
 
 
6.2 Materials and methods 
Participants  
Twenty-one subjects (11 males; mean age ± SD, 24.86 ± 1.80) took part in this 
Experiment. Two participants however had to be excluded from the final sample. 
One of them did not complete the entire session and the other one did not reach 
the accuracy threshold value of 75%. All subjects comprised in the final sample (9 
males; mean age ± SD, 24.79 ± 1.87) were right-handed and with normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. Most of the participants were students at the 
University of Verona, Italy. None of them had previously taken part in similar or 
related studies, and they were all naive as to the purpose of the study. All the 
participants received fixed monetary compensation (10 euros) and gave written 
informed consent before participation. The protocol was approved by the Review 









The experiment and stimuli were created using OpenSesame software for 
Windows (Mathôt et al., 2012). Stimuli were presented on a 17-in CRT monitor. 
Participants were tested in a sound-attenuated, dimly lit room. The viewing 
distance was held constant at 57 cm during the whole session using a chin rest. 
 
Design and procedure 
The experimental session consisted of a first initial practice block, which was only 
necessary in order to allow subjects to become experienced with the task required 
and one Depletion block, which consisted of the main experimental phase. 
The main task was similar to the one adopted by Tommasi et al. (2015) (Tommasi 
et al., 2015). At the beginning of each trial a stimulus display appeared on the 
computer monitor, comprising six identical diamond shapes of 1.2° of visual 
angle, placed at 3.6° from the center of the screen, all colored in either red (RGB 
color coordinates: 235, 0, 0; luminance: 14.6 cd/ m
2
) or green (RGB color 
coordinates: 0, 168 , 0; luminance: 14.6 cd/ m
2
). After an interval lasting 100 or 
200 ms (i.e., referred to as the “pre-display”), the top or the bottom corner of one 
of these placeholders disappeared. This item was the target, and subjects were 
instructed to discriminate its shape by pressing, with their right hand index or 
middle finger, key “1” of the numerical keypad if the base of such pentagon was 
at the top or key “2” if it was at the bottom (Fig.1). The “top” or “bottom” 
response required by the target was equally likely within the experiment. In 50% 
of trials, the so-called “distractor condition”, simultaneously with the target onset, 
one of the other five diamonds changed its color (becoming red instead of green, 
or vice versa) as well as its orientation (45° rotation, becoming a square). This 
highly salient stimulus was completely irrelevant for the task, but given its 
features was assumed to capture attention automatically – via bottom-up 
mechanisms – and pose a great challenge for target selection. Participants were 
encouraged to focus only on the target while completely ignoring the distracting 
element. 




Fig.1 Graphic illustration of an example trial from the practice block. 
 
During practice, each trial began with a white central fixation point display, 
against a black background, lasting 100, 200 or 300 ms. This was followed by the 
trial events described above. After target onset (and distractor onset in distractor 
trials), the search display remained visible for 200 ms and it was followed by a 
blank screen that stayed on until the participant’s response, or for a maximum 
duration of 1000 ms. A new trial began immediately afterwards, as no intertrial 
interval was included (Fig.1).  
 
 





In the Depletion Block, after the central fixation point display and before the onset 
of the stimulus array a full screen image (Codispoti et al., 2007) with either 
positive or negative emotional valence was presented for 300 ms in 80% of the 
trials (40% positive and 40% negative valence) (Fig.2). In the remaining 20% of 
trials a black screen appeared for the same amount of time.  For this purpose, a 
total of 384 images, 192 with a positive valence and 192 with negative valence 
were chosen from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS) Catalogue 
and each of these was repeated at random four times during the course of the 
experiment (Lang, et al., 1999). 
Again, participants were instructed to focus on the target in order to discriminate 
the position (top or bottom) of the base of this pentagon shape, ignoring both the 
emotional response that might have been engendered by the images and the salient 
distractor when they were present in the trial.  
 
Participants completed the initial Practice block of 120 trials, followed by the 
Depletion block. Overall, the Depletion block lasted approximately one hour and 
fifteen minutes and consisted of 1920 trials, of which 1536 (80%) preceded by an 
image with emotional valence (Image present trials) and 384 (20%) trials 
preceded by the black screen (Image absent trials), displayed in a random order. 
Orthogonally, the salient distractor was present in 50% of cases (distractor trials), 
and absent in the remaining ones (no distractor trials). No pauses were provided 
within the experiment. 
At the end of the computerized experiment, participants completed a number of 
self-report questionnaires, assessing different aspects of their personality and 
emotional regulation traits: the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire-Revised (EPQ-
R), assessing three major dimensions of personality which are Neuroticism, 
Psychoticism and Extraversion-Intraversion (Eysenck, S.B.G., et al., 1985), the 
Eysenck’s Impulsivity Inventory (IVE), assessing the personality traits of 
impulsivity, venturesomeness and emphaty (Eysenck, H.J., & Eysenck, S.B.G., 
1991), the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-Y-X1 and STAI-Y-X2) 
(Kabakoff, R.I., et al, 1997), measuring trait and state anxiety and the Difficulties 
in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS), measuring emotion regulation problems 
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(Gratz, K.L., & Roemer, L.,2004). The collection of these data however was 
carried out within the framework of a larger study, involving a much greater 
sample of participants and the aim of which was beyond the scope of this research 
project. For this reason, the information obtained from these questionnaires will 
not be discussed further. 
 
Data analysis 
Analyses were performed using R 3.4.3 (R Core Team, 2016) on performance 
during the experimental block. Repeated-measures analyses of variance 
(ANOVAs) were performed on reaction times (RTs) and error rates, excluding 
trials with a RT below 200 ms, which were considered as anticipated responses. 
We also excluded from further analysis trials in which the RT fell outside ±3 SDs 
from the mean value for each participant and trial type (on average, less than 1% 
of the data were excluded). When appropriate, p values for statistical significance 
were adjusted for multiple comparisons (Holm–Bonferroni correction). 
 
Overall analysis performance 
A first comprehensive analysis of task performance was conducted on the whole 
dataset acquired during the Depletion block. Mean RTs of correct responses and 
error rates were entered into within-subject ANOVAs including as factors 
Distractor Presence (present or absent), Image Presence (present or absent), Block 


















                                   
                             
                              
 
Fig.3 RTs of the overall analysis performance. A. Main effect Distractor Presence. B. Main 
effect Image Presence. C. Interaction Distractor Presence as function of Image Presence. D. 
Cost of Distractor as function of Image Presence and Predisplay duration. 
 
 
Reaction times. The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Distractor 
Presence, F(1, 18) = 669.87, p < .001, ηp2 = .973, with faster responses in the 





(544.33 ms ± 29) (Fig.3 panel a). This difference reflects the typical attentional 
capture effect, suggesting that a salient visual distractor impairs performance to 
the main task by attracting attentional resources to the detriment of other ongoing 
computations. A significant main effect of Image was also found, F(1, 18) =17.99, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .499 (Fig.3 panel b). Indeed, the presence of the emotionally salient 
image seemed to lead to faster RTs. The main effect of Block was significant, F(3, 
54) = 8.05, p < .001, ηp2 = .389, reflecting slower responses in the initial part of 
the session (mean ± SE; Block 1 = 537.62 ms ± 28, Block 2 = 516.49 ms ± 27, 
Block 3 = 511.84 ms ± 27, Block 4 = 510.76 ms ± 27; Block 1 vs Block 2: t(151) = 
6.87, p < .001; Block 2 vs Block 3: t(151) = 2.08, p = 0.03; Block 3 vs Block 4: 
t(151) = 0.44, p = 0.65). The main effect of Predisplay duration was also significant, 
F(1, 18) =102.79, p < .001, ηp2 = .851, showing faster RTs in the 200 ms compared 
to the 100 ms condition. The interaction between Distractor and Image presence 
was marginally significant, F(1, 18) = 4.38, p = 0.0507, ηp2 = .195 (Fig.3 panel c). 
Since the considerable importance of this interaction with respect to our aims of 
research, we decided to assess more directly this effect by taking into account the 
distractor cost, namely, the difference between distractor-present and distractor-
absent condition. This interaction was due to the fact that although in both the 
Distractor-present and absent trials RTs were faster in the Image present condition 
(Image-present vs. Image-absent for Distractor-present trials: t(18) = 2.54, p = 0.02; 
Image-present vs. Image-absent for Distractor-absent trials: t(18) = 4.05, p = 
0.001), the cost due to the presence of the Distractor was slightly higher in trials 
in which an Image was present (difference in ms between Distractor-present vs. 
Distractor-absent for Image-present trials = 53.91 ms vs. Distractor-present vs. 
Distractor-absent for Image-absent trials = 46.69 ms; t(151) = -2.28, p = 0.02 ). This 
finding, albeit marginally significant, suggested that indeed the presence of an 
emotional image had a detrimental impact on attentional processing, so that the 
already costly filtering of a salient irrelevant distractor was amplified if an 
irrelevant image had preceded the display of the task-relevant information. The 
interaction between Distractor Presence and Image Presence was also involved in 
a marginally significant three-way interaction with Predisplay duration F(1, 18) = 





in the shorter Predisplay duration (100 ms) since there was a significant difference 
in Distractor cost between the Image-present and Image-absent condition (Cost of 
Distractor for Image-present vs. Image-absent trials in shorter Predisplay duration 
= 53.81 ms vs. 42.14 ms, t(75) = -2.53, p = 0.01). Whereas, in the longer Predisplay 
duration (200 ms) the cost of Distractor was constant over the two Image 
conditions (Cost of Distractor for Image-present vs. Image-absent trials in longer 
Predisplay duration = 54.01 ms vs. 51.23 ms, t(75) = -0.64, p = 0.51). All the 
remaining effects were far from being significant.  
 
 
                           
 





           
 
Fig.4 Accuracy rates of the overall analysis performance.  A. Main effect Distractor Presence. 
B. Main effect Image Presence. C. Main effect of Predisplay duration. D. Interaction 
Distractor Presence as function of Image Presence and Block. E. Cost of Distractor as 
function of Distractor Presence, Image Presence and Block. 
 
 
Accuracy rates. The ANOVA on the accuracy rates revealed a main effect of 
Distractor Presence, F(1, 18) = 6.50, p = 0.02, ηp2 = .265, with a lower accuracy in 
distractor present trials, further confirming the disruptive effect of distractors on 
task performance and the suitability of our paradigm in measuring such attentional 
capture effect (Fig.4 panel a). There was also a significant main effect of Image 
Presence, F(1, 18) =14.86, p = 0.001, ηp2 = .452, that, differently from what we 
found in RTs, resulted in impaired performance in the Image-present compared to 
the Image-absent condition (Fig.4 panel b). Indeed, it is possible that the presence 
of such a salient image prior to the stimulus display might have given rise to a 
state of nonspecific alertness which on one hand might have speeded task 
responses, while reducing their accuracy, as in typical speed-accuracy trade-offs. 
The significant main effect of Block, F(3, 54) = 9.14, p < .001, ηp2 = .408, revealed, 
that responses became more accurate at the end of the session (mean Block 1 = 
89.57, Block 2 = 91.90, Block 3 = 93.08, Block 4 = 92.94; Block 1 vs Block 2: 
t(151) = -4.69, p < .001; Block 2 vs Block 3: t(151) = -2.39, p = 0.01; Block 3 vs 






marginally significant, F(1, 18) =3.40, p = 0.08, ηp2 = .158 (Fig.4 panel c). This 
potential effect, was also opposite to what found with respect to RTs, with lower 
accuracy in trials with a longer predisplay interval, and similarly to the previously 
discussed effect of Image presence suggests the emergence of a speed-accuracy 
trade-off. The triple interaction involving Distractor Presence by Block by Image 
Presence was also marginally significant, F(3, 54) = 2.49, p = 0.06, ηp2 = .393  
(Fig.4 panel d), suggesting a possibly very interesting relationship between the 
critical factors considered in our study.  
The Distractor cost in the Image-present and Image-absent condition was kept 
constant among Blocks, except in Block 2 where a significant difference was 
highlighted (Cost of Distractor for Image-present vs. Image-absent trials in Block 
1 = 2.63 vs. 2.40, t(37) = 0.16, p = 0.87, Block 2 = -0.20 vs. 3.28, t(37) = -2.84, p = 
0.007, Block 3 = 2.85 vs. 1.19, t(37) = 1.31, p = 0.19, Block 4 = 1.36 vs. 1.43, t(37) 




Impact of emotional valence on task performance 
The results obtained from the overall analysis of the data suggested that, in line 
with what we expected, the emotional Images shown at the beginning of each trial 
had a general impact on task performance. Next, we wanted to explore more 
specifically if the effects on attentional processing assessed by the Distractor cost, 
could be further affected by the valence (positive and negative) of the images 
shown. Therefore, we performed new within-subjects ANOVAs on the 80% of the 
trials in which an image was displayed, considering also its either positive or 
negative valence. The factors in the ANOVAs were Distractor Presence (present 
or absent), Image Valence (positive or negative), Block (1-4), and Predisplay 





                            
 
Fig.5 RTs for the impact of emotional valence on task performance. A. Main effect of Image 
Valence. B. Interaction Distractor Presence as function of Image Presence. 
 
 
Reaction times. As in the overall analysis, the main effects of Distractor Presence, 
F(1, 18) = 1131.58, p <.001, ηp2 = .984, Block, F(3, 54) = 9.99, p <.001, ηp2 = .412 
and Predisplay duration, F(3, 54) = 9.99, p <.001, ηp2 = .833, were significant, and 
their trend was perfectly in line with what had already emerged. More 
interestingly, the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Image Valence, 
F(1, 18) = 16.86, p <.001, ηp2 = .483, reflecting slower RTs when negative images 
were presented compared to the positive ones (Fig.5 panel a). The interaction 
between Distractor Presence and Image Valence was marginally significant, F(1, 18) 
= 4.27, p = 0.05, ηp2 = .191 (Fig.5 panel b). This interaction was due to the fact 
that although in both the Distractor-present and absent conditions RTs were faster 
when images with positive valence were shown (Positive Valence vs. Negative 
Valence for Distractor-present trials: t(18) = -4.01, p = 0.001; Positive Valence vs. 
Negative Valence for Distractor-absent trials: t(18) = -2.27, p = 0.03), the cost 
associated with distractor presence was higher in trials in which the Image shown 
had a negative valence (difference in ms between Distractor-present vs. 
Distractor-absent for Negative Valence Image = 55.91 ms; Distractor-present vs. 
Distractor-absent for Positive Valence Image = 51.66 ms). This finding suggested 






computational load on attentional mechanisms, resulting in increased attentional 
capture effects in the current trial.  The interaction between Block and Predisplay 
duration was also significant, F(3, 54) = 5.73, p = 0.001, ηp2 = .481. Although the 
difference between the two Predisplay durations (100 ms vs.200 ms) was 
significant in all Blocks, this effect was significantly greater in the first block 
compared to the others (100 ms vs. 200 ms by Block 1: t(18) = 8.32, p = 5.5400e-
07; 100 ms vs. 200 ms by Block 2: t(18) = 6.36, p = 1.0844e-05; 100 ms vs. 200 ms 
by Block 3: t(18) = 7.08, p = 3.9420e-06; 100 ms vs. 200 ms by Block 4: t(18) = 
6.02, p = 1.0844e-05).  
 
                           
 






Fig.6. Accuracy rates for the impact of emotional valence on task performance. A. Main 
effect Image Valence. B. Interaction Distractor Presence by Block. C. Interaction Distractor 
Presence as function of Predisplay duration. D. Interaction Distractor Presence as function of 
Block and Predisplay duration. 
 
 
Accuracy rates. The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Distractor 
Presence, F(1, 18) = 10.49, p = 0.004, ηp2 = .368, and Block, F(3, 54) = 8.77 p < .001, 
ηp2 = .411, confirming what already found in RTs and in the previous analysis. In 
this analysis, the main effect of Image Valence or its interaction with the other 
factors did not reach statistical significance (Fig.6 panel a). The interaction 
between Distractor Presence and Block, was marginally significant, F(3, 54) = 2.44 
p = 0.07, ηp2 = .271, suggesting that although accuracy was higher in the 
Distractor-absent condition in all Blocks, the cost due to distractor presence (i.e., 
the difference between Distractor present and absent trials), was only significant 
in Blocks 1, 2 and 4 (Difference between Distractor-present vs. Distractor-absent 
by Block1=  87 vs. 89.40, t(75) = 3.27, p = 0.001, Block 2=  89.41 vs. 92.63, t(75) = 
4.38, p < 0.001, Block 3=  91.87 vs. 93.05, t(75) = 1.65, p = 0.10, Block 4=  91.66 
vs. 93.16, t(75) = 2.08, p = 0.04) (Fig.6 panel b). The interaction between 
Distractor Presence and Predisplay duration were also marginally significant , F(1, 
18) = 4.05 p = 0.05, ηp2 = .183,  indicating that the cost due to distractor presence 
was higher in trials with a predisplay interval of 200 ms (Difference between 
Distractor-present vs. Distractor-absent in the shorter Predisplay duration = 90.67 
vs. 92, Difference between Distractor-present vs. Distractor-absent in the longer 
Predisplay duration = 89.30 vs. 92.12, t(151) = -2.08,  p = 0.03)(Fig.6 panel c). 
Interestingly, the triple interaction between Distractor Presence, Block and 
Predisplay duration was significant, F(3, 54) = 3.04 p = 0.03, ηp2 = .293 (Fig.4d). 
To better understand this triple-way interaction, we performed two separate 
ANOVAs, considering separately trials with different Predisplay durations. In 
these analyses, the interaction between Distractor Presence and Block was 
significant only in the condition of Predisplay duration of 200 ms, F(3, 54) = 2.80, p 
= 0.04, ηp2 = .276 whereas, it was far from being significant with a predisplay of 





cost due to the salient distractor was statistically significant only in the first two 
Blocks (Distractor-absent vs. Distractor-present by Block 1: t(18) = 3.49, p =0.007; 
Distractor-absent vs. Distractor-present by Block 2: t(18) = 3.93, p =0.003; 
Distractor-absent vs. Distractor-present by Block 3: t(18) = 1.06, p =0.30; 
Distractor-absent vs. Distractor-present by Block 4: t(18) = 2.14, p =0.091) (Fig.6 
panel d).  
 
6.3 Discussion 
The aim of this experiment was that of directly exploring the possibility that the 
cognitive resources associated with attentional mechanisms are limited and can be 
depleted. Differently from what found in the mental fatigue phenomenon, we 
expected that such depletion could occur, under conditions of very heavy and 
persistent distraction, in a short period of time (i.e. one-hour session). To this aim, 
in order to, on the one hand, increase the attentional load and, on the other hand, 
increase the distraction information to be filtered out, we introduced in our 
paradigm emotional stimuli, known as powerful retainers of attention, with either 
positive or negative valence.  
The results obtained in this series of analyses, first of all demonstrated the 
efficacy of our paradigm in giving rise to attentional capture (Theeuwes, 2004). 
Indeed, performance varied as a function of distractor presence. In particular, a 
decrease in performance was registered in the distractor-present condition 
compared to the distractor-absent condition, suggesting that bottom-up attentional 
mechanisms were quickly engaged by this salient stimulus, to the detriment of the 
processing of concurrent task relevant information. 
Generally, the classical additional singleton task paradigm (Theeuwes, 1991; 
Theeuwes, 1992), which is typically employed to investigate attentional capture, 
provided measures of this effect by averaging performance within a whole 
session, without considering the possibility that it might change over time. For 
this reason, to better monitor any fluctuation of the availability of attentional 
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resources over time, we decided to analyze the entire timeline of the experimental 
session, dividing it in consecutive blocks.  
Unfortunately, differently from what we expected, we could not observe any signs 
of depletion of the attentional resources during the experimental session, because 
the cost associated with distractor presence, our main index of attentional 
engagement, appeared – if anything – to become lower, instead of higher, across 
consecutive blocks. So, despite all the manipulations applied in order to pose 
great stress and overload on attentional processing, performance seemed to 
improve during the session, perhaps due to the effects of practice with the overall 
task and with the attentional mechanisms involved in target selection and 
distractor filtering. Previous studies have suggested in fact that under normal 
conditions attentional mechanisms can learn to become less sensitive to the 
presence of frequent distractors that seem to lose progressively their attractive 
power (Kelley & Yantis, 2009; Turatto & Pascucci, 2016).  
Regarding the impact of emotional images, our results demonstrated that these 
stimuli exerted a detrimental influence on attentional processing, with greater 
costs in performance associated with images with a negative emotional content. 
However, it is possible that throughout the session, while subjects became more 
experienced with the task and “learned” to manage the emotional responses that 
they engendered, the overall effect due to these images might have become 
progressively lower. Overall responses in trials comprising the display of 
emotional images led to faster but less accurate responses, maybe because their 
intrinsic arousing value induced a stronger autonomic response in participants 
(Buodo, et al., 2002; Schimmack, 2005; Mogg, et al. 2000). Importantly, while 
this arousing effect in RTs was overall higher for images with positive valence 
compared to the negative ones, negative images seemed to affect more 
specifically attentional filtering mechanisms, showing a tendency to modulate 
significantly the attentional capture effect. At any rate, both effects were rather 
weak, and seemed to become even weaker towards the end of the experimental 
session.  
Indeed, it is possible that, given the repeated exposure of the emotional images 





familiar with their content, and this could have contributed to a fading of their 
arousing effects over time.  
Another complexity arose from the fact that all images were intermixed during the 
session, with negative and positive images randomly interleaved. It could be 
therefore hypothesized that if any detrimental effect were triggered by negative 
images, the subsequent processing of an image with an opposite valence might 
have helped “restore” any disruption, and/or vice-versa (Helton & Russell, 2011, 
Ossowski, et al., 2011), leading to a general confound in the modulations to be 
observed in overall performance and in attentional filtering. Several studies in fact 
have proved marked benefits in attentional and memory functions and, more 
generally, in cognitive control after brief interactions with natural scenarios 
(Berman, et al., 2008; Berto, 2005; Cimprich & Ronis, 2003; Faber, Taylor, Kuo, 
& Sullivan, 2002; Hartig et al., 2003; Tennessen & Cimprich, 1995). Indeed, 
many images with positive valence in our sample depicted such kind of natural 
scenes, therefore it is very likely that whenever they appeared on the screen they 
might have counteracted any effect of depletion or fatigue, hindering the 
possibility of finding any decrease in performance over time (Laumann, et al., 
2003).   
To overcome this possible issue, we set out a second experiment, in order to 
explore more systematically the impact of emotional images on the working of 
attentional mechanisms. Experiment 2 employed a between-subjects design and 
comprised three groups of participants, each performing a variation of the same 
experimental task, which was identical to the one adopted in Experiment 1. In 
order to verify whether the random interleaving of images with opposite 
emotional valences could be a real opponent to depletion of attentional resources, 
we applied a new manipulation. In each of the three following experiments, the 
80% of trials containing images was characterized by a specific valence for the 
whole experimental session, namely, positive, negative and neutral, which acted 















7.1 Experiment 2 
The evidence collected in Experiment 1 suggested that, differently from what we 
expected, attentional resources could not be depleted over time.  
However, as discussed above, such failure might have been caused by some of the 
methodological choices made when designing the study. Two main issues might 
have had a detrimental role on our experimental design. Firstly, participants might 
have developed familiarity with the emotional images delivered during the 
experiment. In fact, only a relatively small number of images was selected from 
the International Affective Picture System (IAPS) Catalogue to be used as 
emotional stimuli, specifically 192 images with negative valence and 192 with 
positive valence. Because of their limited number with respect to the number of 
trials in the session, each image was repeated four times during the experimental 
session. Previous research has shown that even stimuli that are able to trigger 
powerful emotional responses when they are first perceived, gradually lose their 
arousing value after repeated exposures (Codisposti et al., 2006; Zald, 2002). It is 
possible therefore that the arousing and attention-grabbing power of our 
emotional images faded over time, reducing at the same time the effort needed to 
filter out their distracting content. Secondly, positive and negative images were 
presented in a random order. As explained above, it is possible that any 
detrimental effect triggered by images with negative valence (which seemed to 
determine the largest costs in subsequent attentional performance), might have 
been counteracted by the succeeding processing of an image with opposite, 
pleasant valence, that might have helped in “restoring” any disruption (Berman, et 
al., 2008; Berto, 2005; Cimprich & Ronis, 2003; Faber, Taylor, Kuo, & Sullivan, 
2002; Hartig et al., 2003; Tennessen & Cimprich, 1995).  
In order to overcome these possible weaknesses of our first study, we designed a 
new experiment.  Again, the aim was that of investigating the possibility that 
attentional resources could be depleted by means of a speeded and attentionally 
demanding attentional task, by displaying non-relevant, but emotionally charged, 
images at the start of each trial. In this case however two main variations were 
introduced with respect to the methods adopted in Experiment 1. On the one hand 
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the emotional valence of the images displayed on each trial was manipulated as a 
between-subjects factor, so that in each group all subjects were exposed to images 
with the same valence for the whole experiment. On the other, we increased the 
sample size of the emotional images, so that each of them was only used in one 
single trial. The visual search task was the same as described in Experiment 1. 
Three groups of participants were recruited, and each group was associated with 
the display of images with a different type of emotional valence: Neutral, Positive 
or Negative.  
 
 
7.2 Materials and methods 
Participants 
Sixty-five participants took part in Experiment 2. Specifically, twenty-two 
participants (10 males; mean age ± SD, 23.31 ± 3.07) took part in the Neutral 
valence condition, twenty-one (10 males; mean age ± SD, 22.71 ± 2.17) in the 
Positive valence condition and twenty-two (12 males; mean age ± SD, 21.72 ± 
1.90) in the Negative valence condition. Overall, five participants had to be 
excluded from the final sample. Three of them were excluded because they did 
not reach the accuracy threshold value of 75% and the other two because they 
abandoned the experiment before completing the whole experimental session. All 
subjects in the final sample (30 males; mean age ± SD, 22.68 ± 2.54; Neutral 
valence condition: 10 males; mean age ± SD, 23.5 ± 3.13; Positive valence 
condition: 9 males; mean age ± SD, 22.7 ± 2.22; Negative valence condition: 11 
males; mean age ± SD, 21.85 ± 1.95) were right-handed and with normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. Most of the participants were students at the 
University of Verona, Italy. None of them had previously taken part in similar or 
related studies, and they were all naive as to the purpose of the study. All the 
participants received fixed monetary compensation for their participation (15 
euros) and gave written informed consent before participation. The protocol was 
approved by the Review Board for Studies involving Human Participants of the 







This was identical to the one used for Experiment 1. 
 








Design and procedure were identical to those of Experiment 1, with the following 
exceptions. 
Participants completed an initial practice block of 60 trials, followed by the 
Depletion block. The experimental session lasted approximately one hour and 
fifteen minutes and consisted of 1920 trials, of which 1536 (80%) were preceded 
by an image with emotional valence (Image present trials) and 384 (20%) trials 
were preceded by colored noise screen (Image absent trials). Image present and 
absent trials were presented in a random order (see Figure 1). 
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Three new sets of images were selected, 1536 for each level of emotional valence: 
Neutral, Positive or Negative. The emotional valence of the image shown at the 
start of each trial was manipulated as a between-subjects factor, so that each group 
of subjects was administered only one set. Images were chosen from International 
Affective Picture System (IAPS) Catalogue, Emotional Pictures Set (EmoPicS), 
Geneva Affective PicturE Database (GAPED), Nencki Affective Picture System 
(NAPS) Catalogues and from Google Images (Lang, et al., 2005; Wessa, et al. 
2010; Marchewka et al., 2014; Riegel et al., 2016; Wierzba et al., 2015; 
Michalowsky et al., 2016; Dan-Glauser & Scherer, 2011). 
 
Data analysis 
This followed the same approach as used before. While emotional valence was 
manipulated across groups of subjects, each group performed the main task in 
trials in which the image was present (80%) and trials in which it was absent 
(20%). The task required to discriminate the target by reporting with a keypress 
the top-or bottom location of its base, and a salient distractor could be present or 
absent in the search array in 50% of cases.  
In line with what we had done in the previous experiment, data analyses were 
initially performed on both mean RTs of correct responses and accuracy rates. A 
close inspection of the results however suggested that the effects of our crucial 
manipulations were to be found specifically in accuracy rates. For the present 
discussion we decided therefore to focus on the results obtained from this 
dependent variable. The results of the same analyses conducted on mean RTs are 
extensively reported in the Appendix 1 section A.  
 
 
Results    
 
Image present trials 
The accuracy rate on the 80% of the trials in which the images were displayed 
were entered into a mixed effects ANOVA including Valence (neutral, positive 





absent), Block (1-4), and Predisplay duration (100 or 200 ms) as within-subjects 
factors. 
 
                   
 
         
 
Fig.2 Image present trials analysis: Main effects. A. Main effect of Distractor Presence. B. 
Main effect of Block. C. Main effect of Predisplay duration. 
 
The ANOVA revealed a main effect of Distractor Presence, F(1, 57) = 72.43, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .559, with lower accuracy in the Distractor-present condition 
compared to the Distractor-absent condition (89.93% vs 92.48%). The salient 
distractor interfered with the task at hand, reflecting the well-known attentional 





171) = 24.65, p < .001, ηp2 = .411, revealing that accuracy increased towards the 
end of the session (Fig.2 panel c). The main effect of Predisplay duration was 
marginally significant, F(1, 57) =3.25, p = 0.07, ηp2 = .054 (Fig.2 panel c), with 
accuracy being overall higher with the shorter Predisplay duration (91.42 % vs 
90.99 %) (Fig.2 panel c).  
 
                  
 
         
          
Fig.3 Image present trials analysis: Interactions between factors. A. Interaction Image 
Valence as function of Block. B. Interaction Block as function of Distractor Presence. C. 








Interestingly, although the main effect of Valence was far from being significant 
(F(2, 57) = 0.33, p = 0.71), the interaction between Valence and Block was 
significant, F(6, 171) = 2.23, p = 0.04, ηp2 = .055 (Fig.3 panel a), suggesting  that 
although the accuracy in all of the three groups improved across consecutive 
blocks (mean acc by Block; Neutral Valence by Block 1 = 86.96, Block 2 = 91.12, 
Block 3 = 92.73, Block 4 = 92.26; Positive Valence by Block 1 = 86.97, Block 2 
= 91.62, Block 3 = 92.40, Block 4 = 92.42; Negative Valence by Block 1 = 90.76, 
Block 2 = 91.94, Block 3 = 92.64, Block 4 = 92.19), this effect was more marked 
for the groups with Neutral and Positive Valence images, whose accuracy was 
significantly lower in the first block, compared to the Negative valence group. In 
the second block the accuracy of the group with Neutral images was still 
significantly lower than the other two, while all groups reached a similar 
performance level afterwards (Neutral Valence by Block 1 vs. Block 2: t(19) = -
4.05, p = 0.002; by Block 2 vs. Block 3: t(19) = -2.37, p = 0.05; by Block 3 vs. 
Block 4: t(19) = 0.96, p = 0.348; Positive Valence by Block 1 vs. Block 2: t(19) = -
3.17, p = 0.04;  by Block 2 vs. Block 3: t(19) = -1.74, p = 0.7; by Block 3 vs. Block 
4: t(19) = -0.04, p = 1; Negative Valence by Block 1 vs. Block 2: t(19) = -1.73, p = 
0.295; by Block 2 vs. Block 3: t(19) = -1.51, p = 0.295; by Block 3 vs. Block 4: t(19) 
= 1.08, p = 0.295) (Fig.3 panel a). The interaction between Block and Distractor 
was also significant, F(3, 171) = 2.75, p = 0.04, ηp2 = .172 (Fig.3 panel b). Accuracy 
was higher in the Distractor-absent condition compared to Distractor-present 
condition and this effect was significant in all of the four Blocks (Distractor-
absent vs. Distractor-present by Block 1: t(59) = 5.55, p < .001; Distractor-absent 
vs. Distractor-present by Block 2: t(59) = 5.06, p < .001; Distractor-absent vs. 
Distractor-present by Block 3: t(59) = 4.04, p < .001; Distractor-absent vs. 
Distractor-present by Block 4: t(59) = 7.70, p < .001). However, the cost associated 
with distractor presence was significantly different between Blocks. In fact, it was 
observed a significant increase only between Block 3 and 4 (Difference in cost of 
Distractor by Block 1 vs. Block 2: 3.26 vs. 2.39, t(119) = 1.45, p = 0.14, by Block 2 
vs. Block 3: 2.39 vs. 1.67, t(119) = 1.39, p = 0.16, by Block 3 vs. Block 4: 1.67 vs. 
2.87, t(119) = -2.58, p = 0.01), reflecting an increase in the cost of distractor in the 
last block. The interaction between Block and Predisplay duration was marginally 
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significant, F(3, 171) = 2.38, p = 0.07, ηp2 = .099, suggesting that, as can be 
appreciated in Fig.3 panel c, the difference between the two Predisplay conditions 
tended to grow throughout the session. 
 
                    
 
      
      
Fig.4 Image present trials analysis: Interactions between factors. A. Cost of Distractor as 
function of Block, Image Valence and Predisplay duration. B. Cost of Distractor as function 
of Block and Image Valence. C. Linear regression analysis of cost of Distractor as function of 










Interestingly, the 4-way interaction between Valence, Distractor, Block and 
Predisplay duration was significant, F(6, 171) = 2.15, p = 0.04, ηp2 = .091 (Fig.4 
panel a). To better understand this interaction, we performed two separate 
ANOVAs, analyzing separately trials with different Predisplay durations. In these 
analyses we focused on the three-way interactions between Valence, Distractor 
and Block, which was crucially in line with the aim of unveiling whether as the 
session proceeded, the presence of an irrelevant, but emotionally charged image, 
would reduce the efficiency of the attentional mechanisms involved in the 
filtering of distractors. Interestingly, this triple interaction approached significance 
in the condition of Predisplay duration of 200 ms, F(6, 171) = 2.10 p = 0.05, ηp2 = 
.085 whereas, in trials with a Predisplay duration of 100 ms, it was rather far from 
being statistically significant, F(6, 171) = 1.66 p = 0.13.  
 
Given the considerable importance of this interaction with respect to our aims of 
research, we decided to assess more directly this effect by taking into account the 
distractor cost, namely, the difference in accuracy between distractor-present and 
distractor-absent condition.  
Interestingly, the cost increased across blocks only in the Negative Valence group 
(Cost of distractor of Negative Valence by Block 1 = 2.37, Block 2 = 1.88, Block 
3 = 2.33, Block 4 = 5.34; Difference in Cost of distractor of Negative Valence by 
Block 1 vs. Block 4 = 2.97, t(19) = -1.75, p = 0.09). The increment in cost from 
Block 1 to Block 4 was around 3%, and was significantly greater than what could 
be observed both in the group with Positive valence images (Difference in Cost of 
distractor of Negative Valence vs. Positive Valence by Block 1 vs. Block 4: t(19) = 
-2.14, p = 0.04) and in the group with Neutral valence images (Difference in Cost 
of distractor of Negative Valence vs. Neutral Valence by Block 1 vs. Block 4: t(19) 
= -2.57, p = 0.01). Indeed in the latter groups the cost tended to decrease across 
blocks, showing a trend that was exactly opposite (Cost of distractor of Positive 
Valence by Block 1 = 3.36, Block 2 = 2.49, Block 3 = 1.02, Block 4 = 1.98; 
Difference in Cost of distractor of Positive Valence by Block 1 vs. Block 4 = -
1.38; Cost of distractor of Neutral Valence by Block 1 = 5.33, Block 2 = 2.80, 
Block 3 = 1.83, Block 4 = 2.01; Difference in Cost of distractor of Neutral 
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Valence by Block 1 vs. Block 4 = -3.32; Difference in Cost of distractor of 
Positive Valence vs. Neutral Valence by Block 1 vs. Block 4: t(19) = 1.07, p = 
0.29)( Fig.4 panel b). In order to conduct a more fine-grained analysis of Block-
dependent variations in distractor costs, we divided each session in eight 
subsequent blocks, and – separately for each group – performed a linear 
regression analysis, on cost as a function of Block (Fig 4 panel C). All the linear 









; Neutral: F(1, 6) = 4.25 p = 0.08, adj-
r
2
 = 0.31), however while in the negative valence condition the trend was towards 
an increase across blocks, the cost tended to decrease significantly in both Neutral 
and Positive conditions. Post-hoc comparisons between the regression coefficients 
associated with each group highlighted the fact that the trend observed in the 
group with negative valence images was significantly different from the other two 
(Slope Coefficient of Negative Valence vs. Positive Valence: t(19) = 2.36, p = 0.02; 
 Negative Valence vs. Neutral Valence: t(19) = 2.93, p = 0.008; Positive Valence 




Image absent trials 
A separate ANOVA was performed on the remaining 20% of trials in 
which, instead of images with emotional content, a colored noise image was 
displayed full screen. Interestingly, this condition was identical for all groups, the 
only difference being the general emotional context triggered by the images 
shown in the other trials. The factors considered were Valence (neutral, positive 
and negative) as the between-subjects factor, Distractor Presence (present or 
absent), Block (1-4) and Predisplay duration (100 or 200 ms) as within-subjects 
factors.  





                          
 
      
             
Fig.5 Image absent trials analysis: Main effects. A. Main effect of Distractor Presence. B. 
Main effect of Block. C. Main effect of Predisplay duration. 
 
The results revealed significant main effects of Distractor Presence, F(1, 57) = 50.44 
p < .001, ηp2 = .469 (Fig.5 panel a), and Block, F(3, 171) = 10.65 p < .001, ηp2 = 
.252 (Fig.5 panel b), which were consistent with those obtained in the analysis of 
responses to image present trials. The effect of Predisplay duration was only 






                           
 
         
           
Fig.6 Image absent trials analysis: Interactions between factors. A. Interaction Block as 
function of Image Valence. B. Cost of Distractor as function of Block and Image Valence. C. 
Linear regression analysis of cost of Distractor as function of Block and Image Valence. 
 
 
The interaction between Valence and Block was significant, F(6, 171) = 2.68, p = 
0.01, ηp2 = .076, and this effect was due to the fact that, in line with the previous 
results, the improvement by block over time was stronger for the Positive and 
Neutral Valence groups (Neutral Valence by Block 1 = 85.88, Block 2 = 92.24, 
Block 3 = 93.12, Block 4 = 92.75; Positive Valence by Block 1 = 88.14, Block 2 








Block 2 = 92.08, Block 3 = 92.51, Block 4 = 92.63), whose accuracy in Block 1 
was significantly lower with respect to the Negative valence group (Neutral 
Valence by Block 1 vs. Block 2: t(19) = -4.40, p < .001; by Block 2 vs. Block 3: 
t(19) = -0.96, p = 0.69; by Block 3 vs. Block 4: t(19) = 0.36, p = 0.71; Positive 
Valence by Block 1 vs. Block 2: t(19) = -2.05, p = 0.16;  by Block 2 vs. Block 3: 
t(19) = -0.62, p = 1; by Block 3 vs. Block 4: t(19) = 0.10, p = 1; Negative Valence by 
Block 1 vs. Block 2: t(19) = -0.05, p = 1; by Block 2 vs. Block 3: t(19) = -0.41, p = 
1; by Block 3 vs. Block 4: t(19) = -0.15, p = 1) (Fig.6 panel a). Interestingly, a 
three-way interaction of Valence by Distractor by Block was very close to 
statistical significance, F(6, 171) = 2.09, p = 0.056, ηp2 = .096. Again, taking into 
account the cost associated with the distractor, an increase was found in the cost 
across blocks, but only for the group with Negative Valence images (Negative 
valence: Block 1 = 0.52, Block 2 = 3.19, Block 3 = 4.48, Block 4 = 4.43; Block 1 
vs. Block 4 = 3.91,t(39) = -1.97, p = 0.05) while for both the groups with Neutral 
and Positive Valence images the cost tended to decrease across blocks (Positive 
Valence: Block 1 = 4.19, Block 2 = 2.49, Block 3 = 3.39, Block 4 = 1.65; Block 1 
vs. Block 4 = -2.54; Neutral Valence: Block 1 = 6.26, Block 2 = 0.94, Block 3 = 
1.85, Block 4 = 2.27; Block 1 vs. Block 4 = -3.99)(Fig.6 panel b). In line with the 
approach adopted with respect to the trials in which an image was present, we 
performed separate linear regression analyses on costs by Block in the three 
groups, focusing on trials with a Predisplay duration of 200 ms. Although the 
overall trend was very similar to what observed in the previous analysis, on image 
present trials, none of these analyses reached statistical significance. The post-hoc 
t-test, run to investigate whether the linear coefficients of the three regression 




In this Experiment, the main effects of our manipulations were crucially revealed 
by error rates, as the same analyses performed on RTs of correct responses led to 
mainly non-significant results (see Appendix). This might have been due to the 
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fact that the paradigm required speeded responses, allowing a very short deadline 
for response delivery. Such fast and forced response pace might in fact have 
limited the possibility of observing effects associated with the crucial 
manipulations in RTs. As a matter of fact, the only significant effect emerging in 
RTs was a generalized improvement of performance across blocks, with responses 
becoming faster towards the end of the session (see Appendix). On the other hand, 
the need to respond very quickly led to an overall significant fraction of error 
trials, with the error rate being significantly affected by the experimental 
manipulations. 
As in Experiment 1, our paradigm proved to be suitable for measuring attentional 
capture in all of the three groups. Indeed, capture of exogenous attention by the 
salient distractor caused disruption in the ongoing task, and a decrease in 
performance was systematically observed in the distractor-present condition 
compared to the distractor-absent condition.   
As already discussed, in Experiment 1 we failed to observe any sign of depletion 
during the experimental session, since the costs associated with distractor 
suppression, both in RTs and in error rates, tended to become smaller (instead of 
larger) towards the end of the experimental session. In line with our hypothesis, if 
it was possible to deplete specifically the cognitive resources associated with 
selective attention, one should expect that the more the resources become depleted 
with the ongoing task, the higher should become the cost due to the need to filter 
out salient distractors. In that case however we reasoned that two aspects of the 
adopted paradigm might have prevented the depletion of attentional resources. On 
the one hand, the repetition of the emotional images during the session might have 
increased their familiarity and reduced their arousing value, leading to lower 
interference with the main task. On the other, the use of images with different 
emotional valence, and possibly different impact on attentional processes, might 
have led to confounds in the observed effects, as described above in the 
Introduction. Therefore, in this experiment, we adopted a large sample of new 
images arranged according to their valence and administered them separately to 





observe crucial differences associated with the delivery of irrelevant images with 
a different emotional valence.  
Indeed, the results of Experiment 2 suggested that the attentional mechanisms 
involved in distraction filtering were affected by the different emotional content 
of the images. In particular, Negative and Positive images had an opposite effect 
on the ongoing attentional processing, with intermediate – virtually null – effects 
associated with Neutral images (Fig.4 panel a). Up to now, there is substantial 
amount of support for the claim that emotional information, even if it is task-
irrelevant, can capture attention disrupting task performance (Hodsoll, et al., 
2011; Yiend, 2010). Moreover, many studies have also demonstrated that 
emotional stimuli are processed faster and modulate the processing of other 
concomitant stimuli (Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2003; Eastwood et al., 2001; Eimer & 
Holmes, 2002; Globish, et al., 1999; Krolak-Salmon et al., 2006). However, it is 
still debated whether their processing is automatic, and therefore systematically 
prioritized, or depends on the availability of attentional resources, and therefore 
can occur only under certain conditions (Pessoa, 2005; Pessoa, et al., 2002; 
Vuilleumier, 2005; Vuilleumier et al., 2001). In line with this literature, with 
Experiment 2 we demonstrated that task-irrelevant images with an emotional 
content indeed exerted a detrimental influence on attentional processing, with 
greater costs in performance associated with images with negative valence. 
Accordingly, many studies have shown that negative stimuli elicit more rapid and 
more prominent responses than do positive or neutral ones (Armony & Dolan, 
2002; Erthal, et al., 2005; Pessoa, et al., 2005; Anderson, et al., 2003; Mogg & 
Bradley, 1998; Mogg et al., 2000; Baumeister, et al., 2001; Cacioppo & Gardner, 
1999; Taylor, 1991). Most theorists agree that the bias towards negative 
information originates from a purely evolutionary perspective according to which 
negative stimuli signal danger and, hence, must be processed quickly, allowing 
for the execution of an appropriate behavioural response. In addition, it has been 
shown that negative emotional stimuli compete heavily for attentional resources 
as they appear to capture and retain attention (Kern et al., 2005, Helton et al., 
2011). In line with this literature, with our first between-subjects analysis, carried 
out on the trials preceded by task-irrelevant but emotionally charged images (80% 
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of trials), we could assist to a depletion of attentional resources in a very short 
period of time, i.e. one-hour session, in the group with negative valence images. 
In fact, we found a substantial reduction in distractor filtering efficiency 
throughout the experimental session only in the negative group, where the cost 
associated with attentional capture by the salient distractor in the search display 
increased significantly. On the other hand, an improvement in performance was 
registered in the groups to which positive or neutral images were shown at the 
start of each trial (Fig.4 panel b). Here the cost due to distractor filtering tended to 
decrease within the session.  Previous studies have shown that the attentional 
system can learn to become less sensitive to the presence of frequent distractors 
over time and, therefore, such improvement suggested that the delivery of positive 
and neutral emotional images did not interfere with the beneficial effects of 
attentional learning (Kelley & Yantis, 2009; Turatto & Pascucci, 2016). The 
reduction in the attentional capture cost was especially evident in the group with 
positive images. This result could perhaps be expected since it is known that 
marked overall benefits can be observed in cognitive and attentional control 
processes after brief interactions with scenes depicting natural environments, and 
many of the positive images in our sample represented natural scenes (Berman, et 
al., 2008; Berto, 2005; Cimprich & Ronis, 2003; Faber, Taylor, Kuo, & Sullivan, 
2002; Hartig et al., 2003; Tennessen & Cimprich, 1995). 
It is of particular importance to notice that similar results were found in the 
analysis performed on responses to trials that were not preceded by images with 
an emotional content (20% of trials). Hence, even when no image was shown 
prior to the search display, the cost associated with distractor filtering tended to 
increase across the session in the group that was exposed to negative valence 
images compared to the other two. This finding suggests that the prolonged 
exposure to emotional stimuli over the experimental session produced an 
emotional context effect, which extended and amplified the impact of the 
emotional images shown. Altogether, these results provide a unique evidence of 
how images with emotional content might interfere with the working of 
attentional mechanisms and induce a systematic depletion of attentional resources 





In conclusion, differently from Experiment 1, in Experiment 2 we could 
demonstrate a depletion of attentional resources under condition of very heavy 
and persistent taxing of attentional processing in a very short period of time, i.e. 
one-hour session. Moreover, our results revealed that emotional stimuli with a 
negative valence, even if task-irrelevant, can be considered as powerful stressors 
for the attentional system, impairing not only the ability of an individual to resist 
distraction per se, but also to recover the efficiency of attentional processing 
resources over time on a trial by trial basis, leading to the depletion of such 
resources. 
Importantly, all of these effects emerged remarkably in trials with a longer 
Predisplay duration. This interval consisted of a blank period intervening between 
the offset of the emotional image and the onset of the display comprising the task-
relevant stimuli. Hence, the impact of (negative) emotional images on attentional 
deployment and the depletion of attentional resources was maximum when more 
time was allowed for the lingering processing of emotional information. These 
could therefore be analyzed more deeply, determining a more widespread 
engagement of different brain systems, specifically involving the processing of 
their semantic and arousing contents. 
Since the present findings do suggest that the processing of task-irrelevant 
negative stimuli can disrupt overall target selection and distraction filtering, we 
aimed at investigating whether such effects can vary according to the degree to 
which the processing of the emotional contents of the stimuli is allowed by the 
experimental context. Indeed, if the detrimental effects on attentional processing 
are due to the fact that negative stimuli access higher-level processing 
automatically, one could expect that irrespectively of all other factors, the 
presence of such stimuli during task performance will exert the same effects. On 
the other, if the attentional priority of negative images depends on the availability 
of cognitive resources and is affected by top-down signals, one might expect that 
by manipulating the task requirements relative to these images it will be possible 
also to vary their impact on the concomitant attentional task. 
We decided to explore more systematically these possibilities by setting out two 
further experiments. These aimed on the one hand to replicate the general context 
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of the Negative image condition of Experiment 2, but on the other to either 
increase or reduce the degree to which the systematic processing of the negative 
images was allowed during the course of the experiment. Specifically, in 
Experiment 3 we wanted to reduce the impact of the images with negative 
valence, by engaging subjects on a secondary task which was to be carried out in 
parallel to the main visual search task. The need to divide processing resources 
between two tasks, both relevant for the experiment, might have left less chances 
for an automatic processing of the emotional content in the pictures, limiting 
therefore its impact on performance. Conversely, in Experiment 4 we wanted to 
emphasize the emotional response that could be generated after the presentation of 
each image by introducing a Mood Induction Procedure before the start of the 
experimental session, which is thought to enhance the processing of emotional 










Reducing the detrimental effect of negative 
emotional stimuli  
88 
 
8.1 Experiment 3 
The results of Experiment 2 provided a clear evidence that when confronted with 
heavy and persistent distraction the resources needed for attentional filtering may 
become depleted, and this occurs within a relatively short period of time, i.e. one-
hour. Indeed, the extra load on attentional selection was elicited by the display of 
images with emotional content, which interfered heavily with attentional 
mechanisms, even when they were completely irrelevant for the task at hand. In 
particular, this effect was crucially linked to images with negative valence, adding 
to the growing literature indicating that, among emotional stimuli, those with a 
negative valence compete more strongly for attentional resources, being able to 
attract and retain attention more efficiently (Hodsoll, et al., 2011; Yiend, 2010; 
Anderson & Phelps, 2001; Keil & Ihssen, 2004; Ohman et al., 2001; Zeelenberg 
et al., 2006; Kern et al., 2005, Helton et al., 2011).  
Based on this literature, and on our initial findings, we hypothesized that, by 
manipulating the degree to which emotional stimuli were able to engage 
attentional resources, one might be able to observe differences in task 
performance, which would reflect not only a different overall impact on 
attentional selection per se, but also on the depletion of attentional resources 
during the experimental session.  
Interestingly, in Experiment 2, the largest effects of our manipulations were 
obtained in trials with a longer Predisplay duration (i.e., 200 ms). In fact, as 
discussed previously, it was found that images with negative emotional content 
exerted a stronger impact on the deployment of attention, thus leading to depletion 
of attentional resources when more time was allowed for the lingering processing 
of emotional information. 
In addition, it has been demonstrated that negative stimuli might also alter 
subjective mood, inducing conscious task-unrelated thoughts that require further 
attentional resources and determine a subsequent performance cost (Smallwood, 
et al., 2009, Smallwood, 2010). Given these premises, we hypothesized that the 
longer was the time allowed to process the images prior to the display of the task-





these reasons in Experiment 3 we decided to use only emotional images with a 
negative valence, and increase the duration of the longer Predisplay in our 
paradigm, bringing it to 400 ms, in order to create in this experimental condition a 
larger temporal gap from the view of the image to the onset of the stimuli, and 
allowing a greater opportunity for the emotional content of the images to exert 
their influence on attentional mechanisms and determine a greater consumption of 
attentional resources.  
Having said this, with Experiment 3 we wanted to test more specifically whether 
it was possible to manipulate the impact exerted by images with negative 
emotional content on attentional mechanisms, in particular by reducing their 
disruptive effects.  
To this aim, another manipulation was applied on the original paradigm used in 
the previous experiments. Participants performed the same visual search task of 
Experiment 2. In addition, however, they were required to perform a secondary 
task that involved the emotional images, which therefore ceased to be task-
irrelevant. Such secondary task however was designed in order to push subjects to 
process the pictures with regard to a non-emotional feature, with respect to which 
their emotional content was completely irrelevant.  
Participants in fact were asked to count the number of all the images in the session 




8.2 Materials and methods 
Participants  
Twenty participants (11 males; mean age ± SD, 21.55 ± 1.64) took part in the 
Experiment. All subjects were right-handed and with normal or corrected-to-
normal vision. Most of the participants were students at the University of Verona, 
Italy. None of them had previously taken part in similar or related studies, and 
they were all naive as to the purpose of the study. All the participants received 
fixed monetary compensation for their participation (15 euros) and gave written 
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informed consent before participation. The protocol was approved by the Review 




This was identical to the one used for Experiment 1 and 2. 
 
Design and procedure 
Participants, as in the previous experiment, completed an initial practice block of 
60 trials, followed by a single session for the experiment proper. The 
experimental session lasted approximately one hour and thirty minutes and 
consisted of 1920 trials. 
Design and procedure were identical to those of Experiment 2 (negative valence 
condition), with the following exceptions.  
The Predisplay duration could last 100 or 400 ms (as opposed to 100 and 200 ms), 
and a secondary task was carried out in parallel to the main visual search task. As 
anticipated above, participants were required to count and keep in mind the 
number of images containing animals over the experimental session and, at the 
end, to report this number to the experimenter. This task however was merely 
used as an experimental manipulation, and the number reported by subjects at the 
end of the session was not considered in data analysis. 
 
Data analysis 
This followed the same approach as used before. In line with what we had done in 
the previous experiment, data analyses were initially performed on both RTs and 
accuracy rates. However, since the effect of our crucial manipulation for this 
paradigm were better expressed by accuracy rates, for the present discussion we 
decided to mainly focus on accuracy rates results.  The results of the same 










Image present trials 
The data obtained in the 80% of trials, in which the images were displayed, were 
entered into a repeated measures ANOVA in which Distractor Presence (present 
or absent), Block (1-4) and Predisplay duration (100 or 400 ms) were within-
subjects factors.  
 
                             
 
          
 
Fig.1 Image present trials analysis. A. Main effect of Distractor Presence. B. Main effect of 





The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Distractor Presence, F(1, 19) = 
17.38, p < .001, ηp2 = .477, reflecting attentional capture, since in the condition 
Distractor-absent the accuracy was significantly higher compared to the 
Distractor-present condition (92.25 % vs 90.08 %) (Fig.1 panel a). 
There was also an improvement in performance over time, supported by a 
significant main effect of Block, F(3, 57) = 6.91, p < .001, ηp2 = .458 (Fig.1 panel 
b). Interestingly, neither the main effect of Predisplay (F(1, 19) = 0.004, p = 0.94), 
or its interactions with Distractor presence (F(1, 19) = 0.051, p = 0.82), nor 
Distractor presence and Block, reached significance, F(3, 57) = 2.08, p = 0.11 (Fig.1 
panel c). This result appears at first to contradict our experimental hypothesis that 
by increasing Predisplay duration we might have increased the impact of negative 
images on the depletion of attentional resources. As a matter of fact, performance 
to the main task appeared now rather insensitive to Predisplay duration.  
 
 
                            
           
Fig.2 Image present trials analysis. A. Cost of Distractor as function of Block and Predisplay 











As we can clearly see from Fig.2 panel a, the cost of distractor in both conditions 
of Predisplay duration was constant over the experimental session. In order to 
better explore this negative result, we performed a linear regression analysis on 
the interaction of Distractor by Block, focusing in particular on the longer 
Predisplay duration (which in this Experiment was 400 ms), and compared these 
results with those obtained in the same analysis performed on the data obtained in 
Experiment 2 (Negative valence condition, longer Predisplay duration – 200 ms). 
The experimental session was divided into eight blocks to better capture any 
quantitative difference over time. The linear regression analysis on the data 
collected in the present Experiment was marginally significant, F(1, 37) = 2.92, p 
= 0.09, ηp2 = .071 (Fig.2 panel b).  With respect to Experiment 2, however, in 
which the trend reflected increasing cost due to distractor filtering over time, in 
the present experiment the data seemed to suggest an opposite tendency (direct 
comparison between the Slope Coefficients of Negative Valence Experiment 2 vs. 
Experiment 3: t(19) = -1.83, p = 0.08).  
Indeed, the secondary task introduced in this version of the paradigm seemed to 
have limited the detrimental effects on attentional resources that had emerged in 
Experiment 2. On the one hand, if the processing resources tapped by the 
secondary task were the same involved in the main task, we should have observed 
marked signs of resource depletion throughout the session. Since this was not the 
case, we must conclude that the secondary task hinged on processing resources - 
presumably associated with working memory and executive functioning - that are 
independent from visual selective attention. On the other hand, these results also 
suggest that the emotional contents of the images were less able to engage 
automatically visual selective attention, posed lower needs for attentional 
filtering, and consequently did not contribute to the depletion of the related 








Image absent trials 
 
                         
 
           
 
                              
Fig.3 Image absent trials analysis. A. Main effect Distractor Presence. B. Interaction 
Distractor Presence as function of Block and Predisplay duration. C. Cost of Distractor as 
function of Block and Predisplay duration. 
 
Another repeated measures ANOVA was carried out on the remaining 20% of 
trials in which, instead of images with emotional content, a colored noise was 
displayed. As usual, the factors considered were Distractor Presence (present or 







The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Distractor, F(1, 19) = 5.90, p = 
0.02, ηp2 = .237 reflecting again the attentional capture effect (Distractor-absent 
vs. Distractor-present condition: 93.44 % vs. 91.21 %) (Fig.3 panel a). The 
interaction of Distractor by Block by Predisplay duration was again not 
significant, F(3, 57) = 1.89, p = 0.14 (Fig.3 panel b); in fact, the cost of distraction 
was constant over the experimental session and in both Predisplay conditions, as 
in the previous analysis (Fig.3 panel c). 
 
            
 
Fig.4 Image absent trials analysis. A. Linear regression analysis of cost of Distractor as 
function of Block and Image Valence. 
 
Following the approach adopted above, a linear regression analysis was 
performed, to investigate more specifically any variations of the distractor 
filtering cost during the session, focusing on trials with a longer Predisplay 
duration and dividing the session in 8 timepoints. The linear regression however 




The principal objective of the present experiment was to establish the extent to 




resources dedicated to the working of attentional mechanisms. Several studies 
demonstrated that negative emotional stimuli, even if task-irrelevant, gain 
preferential access to cognitive control and their automatic processing can disrupt 
overall attentional performance and specifically target selection and distraction 
filtering (Hodsoll, et al., 2011; Yiend, 2010). After having established in 
Experiment 2 that these effects can also lead to a depletion of processing 
resources dedicated to selective attention, in this Experiment we wanted to 
investigate whether such effects can vary according to the degree to which the 
processing of the emotional contents of the stimuli is allowed by the experimental 
context. In particular, we aimed to reduce the impact of the images with negative 
valence, by engaging subjects on a secondary task which was to be carried out in 
parallel to the main visual search task and required subjects to encode and 
categorize the emotional images from a non-emotional perspective.  
It is widely recognised that negative emotional stimuli are attention attractors and 
retainers (Anderson & Phelps, 2001; Keil & Ihssen, 2004; Ohman et al., 2001; 
Zeelenberg et al., 2006) and as a consequence they compete for processing 
resources, drawing them away from other concurrent stimuli and tasks (Kern et 
al., 2005, Helton et al., 2011). These general effects were replicated in 
Experiments 1 and 2, and the results of Experiment 2 further suggested that the 
systematic need to ignore highly interfering negative emotional stimuli caused the 
depletion of attentional resources in a relatively short period of time. In addition, 
this effect was magnified in the condition of Prediplay duration with longer 
timing, suggesting that the depletion of attentional resources was more marked if 
more time was allowed to process the semantic contents of the images, prior to the 
onset of the task-relevant stimuli. Based on this finding, in Experiment 3 we 
decided to further increase the Predisplay duration, in order to provide a larger 
temporal gap between the display of the emotional image and the onset of the 
stimuli requiring a behavioural response. We reasoned that such longer time 
would allow for an even deeper processing of the emotional images, leading to a 
more widespread engagement of different brain systems and resources. Moreover, 
as explained above, negative emotional stimuli have also proved to alter the 





2009, Smallwood, 2010) that compete for further attentional resources (McVay & 
Kane, 2010). By increasing the Predisplay duration we consequently expected a 
larger consume of attentional resources also due to the growing amount of task-
unrelated thoughts that could be generated, and that might need to be suppressed. 
More importantly and more relevant to our primary objective, in Experiment 3 we 
added another crucial manipulation. Participants were engaged in a secondary task 
which was to be carried out in parallel to the main visual search task. Specifically, 
we chose a working memory task in which subjects were asked to count and keep 
in mind over the experimental session all images containing animals. Hence, 
while leaving a longer time for the “automatic” processing of the semantic 
emotional content of the pictures, we also implicitly invited subjects to process 
them from a non-emotional perspective, focusing on scene analytical details rather 
than on their overall meaning. By doing this, we thought that the increased 
perceptual and cognitive load would leave fewer resources available and thus the 
interference produced by negative emotional stimuli would be reduced. In fact, 
many studies suggested that by increasing the cognitive or attentional load it is 
possible to reduce the emotionally-driven activation in regions such as the 
amygdala (Clarke & Johnstone, 2013; Taylor et al., 2003; Northoff et al., 2004; 
Van Dillen et al., 2009).  The subsequent lack of available cognitive and 
attentional resources could limit the possibility for emotional stimuli to be 
processed sufficiently so to interfere with the task at hand. In line with this 
literature, the results of Experiment 3 indeed suggested that the impact of negative 
emotional stimuli on concurrent attentional tasks is not automatic, and that 
cognitive and perceptual load could modulate their detrimental effects on 
attentional mechanisms. Here in fact, contrary to what we found in the Negative 
image condition of Experiment 2, where the cost associated with the salient 
distractor in the search display increased towards the end of the session – 
suggesting the depletion of processing resources involved in the filtering of 
distracting information –the attentional capture effect observed was constant 




The consistent engagement of top-down control mechanisms, elicited by the 
secondary task in the current Experiment might thus have facilitated the 
processing of task-related stimuli by protecting it from the interfering emotional 
effects. Such protective effect might have originated from an involvement of the 
prefrontal cortex, the brain area that, according to several studies, is related to the 
cognitive regulation of emotional responses (Davidson, 2002; Ochsner & Gross, 
2005), and is known for exerting a top-down inhibitory effect on the amygdala 
(Pears et al., 2003; Rosenkranz et al., 2005; Izquierdo & Murray, 2005; Quirk and 
Beer, 2006; Carmichael & Price, 1995; McDonald et al., 1996). In fact, many 
studies have reported an attenuated amygdala reactivity to emotional stimuli 
during emotion regulation, associated with an increased activation of prefrontal 
brain regions (Ochsner et al., 2002; Urry et al., 2006), consistent with the notion 
that frontal cortex exerts a top-down inhibitory influence on the amygdala. 
Specifically, several fMRI studies reported an increase in activity in ventrolateral, 
dorsolateral and dorsomedial prefrontal cortices when the negative emotional 
experiences were reduced through cognitive strategies (Ochsner & Gross, 2005). 
This might represent a viable explanation for the reduced impact of negative 
images, suggesting that their emotional content could not be processed 
automatically.  
In conclusion, with Experiment 3 we indeed observed an effective reduction of 
the impact that negative emotional stimuli exert on attentional mechanisms and a 
relative sparing of attentional resources in time.  
As a next step, we decided to test whether – conversely – it was possible to 
increase the impact of emotional images on attentional processing resources by 
emphasizing the emotional response that could be generated after the presentation 
of each image. To this aim, we carried out another experiment in which, in order 
to enhance the automatic emotional responses to the negative images we 
introduced a Mood Induction Procedure (Bartolini E.E., 2011) which was 
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9.1 Experiment 4 
With Experiment 3, we demonstrated that, by introducing a secondary task which 
increased the cognitive load and at the same time required subjects to analyse the 
emotional images from a non-emotional perspective, we were able to reduce the 
detrimental effects of negative images on attentional processing. This effect was 
most likely due to a reduction in the degree to which images with negative 
valence were systematically processed during the experimental session.  
In this new Experiment, we aimed to obtain an opposite effect, so that by 
emphasizing the processing of the emotional contents of negative images, we 
might observe strongly disruptive effects on the deployment of attentional 
resources, replicating and possibly extending the findings of Experiment 2. As 
already discussed, previous studies suggested that the exposure to negative 
emotional stimuli might consume attentional resources and lead to performance 
costs because, by altering the subjective mood, they induce conscious thoughts 
that need to be suppressed (Smallwood, et al., 2007; Smallwood, et al., 2009, 
Smallwood, 2010; Farrin et al., 2003; Watts et al., 1988). Accordingly, fMRI 
studies have reported a large overlap between areas involved in the experience of 
sad mood and in high-level cognitive processing. Specifically, studies have 
revealed that sad mood exerts an influence on the activity of a common set of 
prefrontal and limbic brain regions (Davidson et al., 2002; Mayberg et al., 1999). 
For example, studies performed in normal subjects with sad mood, showed an 
alteration of neural activity in prefrontal cortices, specifically in dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (Aalto et al., 2002; Gemar et al., 1996; Liotti et al., 2000; 
Mayberg et al., 1999) and in medial regions including the anterior cingulate cortex 
(for reviews, see Phan et al., 2002), and an enhanced activation of the amygdala 
(Mayberg et al, 1999; Murphy et al., 2003; Phan et al., 2002; Phillips et al, 2003a, 
2003b; Drevets, 2003; AAlto et al., 2002; Eugene et al., 2003; Lane et al., 1997; 
Levesque et al., 2003).  
Following the evidence of distributed and overlapping substrates of sad mood and 
executive functions (Bower & Foras, 2001;for reviews, see Austin et al., 1999; 





described above between sad mood and cognitive performance, we expected that 
by manipulating the subjective mood of our participants, to render them even 
more prone to experience the negative affective/emotional value of the images 
shown during the experimental session, we might enhance the detrimental 
influence of negative emotional images on attentional processing and the 
depletion of the associated cognitive resources.  
In Experiment 4, participants performed the same visual search task adopted in 
our previous Experiments, and all the experimental conditions replicated the 
procedure of Experiment 3, with the exception that in this case there was no 
secondary task to perform with respect to the emotional images, and task 
instructions were the same as in Experiments 1 and 2. To address our aim, 
however, we introduced a negative Mood Induction Procedure before the start of 
the experimental session, which is typically employed to induce participants to 
experience a specific mood, the effects of which can affect subsequent cognitive 
testing (for review, see Gilet, 2008). 
 
 
9.2 Materials and methods 
Participants 
Twenty-two participants (11 males; mean age ± SD, 23.54 ± 2.93) took part in the 
Experiment. Two participants had to be excluded because they did not complete 
the experimental session. All subjects of the final sample (9 males; mean age ± 
SD, 23.45 ± 2.96) were right-handed and with normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. Most of the participants were students at the University of Verona, Italy. 
None of them had previously taken part in similar or related studies, and they 
were all naive as to the purpose of the study. All the participants received fixed 
monetary compensation for their participation (15 euros) and gave written 
informed consent before participation. The protocol was approved by the Review 






In addition to the other materials, identical to those used for Experiments 1, 2 and 
3, for this Experiment we developed a Mood Induction Procedure following the 
guidelines provided by Bartolini E.E. (Bartolini E.E., 2011), which aimed 
specifically at inducing sadness in participants. This consisted of a series of six 
movie clips ranging from 1 minutes and 27 seconds to 2 minutes and 50 seconds 
in length, with an average length of 2 minutes. In selecting the movie clips for 
inclusion in the experiment, particular relevance was given to the specific details 
of the scene, such as background music, length and plot details, in order to 
provide an intelligible plot in a short amount of time. Every clip was presented in 
Italian. More detailed information about each clip, including start time, end time, 
scene description, year of production and total run time, are provided in the 
Appendix 2. 
 
Design and procedure 
Design and procedure were identical to those for Experiment 3, with the exception 
that in this case no secondary task was to be performed with respect to the 
emotional images appearing prior to the search display. Task instructions were 
therefore the same as in Experiments 1 and 2. 
Participants were seated in a dimly lit room and the experimental session started 
with the display of the six movie clips on the computer screen, for 15 minutes ca. 
After that, as in the previous experiments, they completed an initial practice block 
of 60 trials, followed by a single session for the experiment proper. The 
experimental session lasted approximately one hour and thirty minutes and 
consisted of 1920 trials. 
 
Mood. To allow the formal assessment of their mood, participants were asked to 
complete the Profile Of Mood States (POMS) questionnaire (McNair et al., 1971), 
at three time-points during the experimental session: Before the mood induction 
procedure (T1), immediately after it (T2), and at the end of the session (T3). The 
questionnaire consists of 65 5-point adjective rating scales which are factored into 





Fatigue and Confusion. Each of the six states is defined by adjectives descriptive 




This followed the same approach as used before. In line with what we had done in 
the previous experiments, data analyses were initially performed on both RTs and 
accuracy rates. However, since the effect of our crucial manipulation for this 
paradigm were better expressed by accuracy rates, for the present discussion we 
decided to focus on accuracy rates results.  The results of the same analyses 




Image present trials 
A repeated measures ANOVA was performed on the accuracy rates of responses 
in the 80% of the trials, in which the images were displayed. The factors included 
were Distractor Presence (present or absent), Block (1-4) and Predisplay duration 
(100 or 400 ms), all within-subjects. 
 
                                            
 
Fig.1 Image present trials analysis: Main effects. A. Main effect of Distractor Presence. B. 





The ANOVA yielded a significant main effect on Distractor Presence, F(1, 19) = 
10.39, p = 0.004, ηp2 = .353 indicating the attentional capture effect, as found in 
the previous experiments (Distractor absent vs. Distractor present condition: 93.45 
% vs. 91.13 %) (Fig.1 panel a). There was also a significant main effect of Block, 
F(3, 57) = 3.50, p = 0.02, ηp2 = .417 suggesting that also in this experiment 
performance improved over time (Fig.1 panel b).   
 
                              
 
         
 
Fig.2 Image present trials analysis: Interactions between factors. A. Interaction Distractor 







Block and Predisplay duration. C. Linear regression analysis of cost of Distractor as function 
of Block and Image Valence. 
 
 
Interestingly, the three-way interaction Distractor by Block by Predisplay duration 
was not significant, F(3, 57) = 0.74, p = 0.52 (Fig. 2 panel a). However, a close 
inspection of the data (Fig. 2 panel b), seemed to suggest that in the condition 
with a longer Predisplay duration (400 ms) the cost in distractor filtering 
increased over the experimental session, in line with what was previously found in 
the Negative value condition of Experiment 2. In fact, post-hoc comparison 
revealed a significant increase in cost of distractor over time only in the condition 
of longer Predisplay duration (Difference in Cost of distractor in trials with longer 
Predisplay duration, Block 1 vs. Block 4: t(159) = -3.94, p < .001; Difference in 
Cost of distractor in trials with shorter Predisplay duration, Block 1 vs. Block 4: 
t(159) = -0.57, p = 0.56) (Fig. 2 panel b). 
As for Experiment 3, in order to conduct a more fine-grained analysis of Block-
dependent variations in distractor costs, we divided each session in eight 
subsequent blocks to better capture any quantitative difference that might have 
emerged over time, and performed a linear regression analysis, on cost as a 
function of Block (Fig. 2 panel c). We considered the condition with longer 
Predisplay duration (400 ms) since the main results of Experiment 2 were 
obtained in this condition. The linear regression analysis did not reach statistical 
significance, F(1,37) = 0.22, p = 0.63. As we expected, however, the cost seemed to 
vary linearly, as a function of Block, expressing the same trend that had emerged 
in Experiment 2. As can be appreciated in Figure 2 panel c, in both the Negative 
condition of Experiment 2 and in the present one, the trend seemed to reflect an 
increasing cost due to distractor filtering over time. By comparing directly the 
coefficients of the linear regressions conducted on the two experiments we were 
able to establish that they were not significantly different (t(19) = 0.48, p = 0.63; 






Image absent trials 
As usual, another ANOVA was performed on the remaining 20% of trials in 
which, instead of images with emotional content, coloured noise was displayed. 
We considered the same within-subjects factors of the previous analysis, which 
were Distractor Presence (present or absent), Block (1-4) and Predisplay duration 
(100 or 400 ms). 
                              
 
 Fig.3 Image absent trials analysis. A. Main effect of Distractor Presence. B. Linear regression 
analysis of cost of Distractor as function of Block and Image Valence. 
 
 
The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Distractor, F(1, 19) = 9.66, p = 
0.005, ηp2 = .337, reflecting again the attentional capture effect (Distractor absent 
vs. Distractor present condition: 93.87 % vs. 91.57 %) (Fig. 3 panel a). In line 
with the approach adopted with respect to the trials in which an image was 
present, we performed separate linear regression analyses on costs by Block in the 
present Experiment and in the corresponding conditions of Experiment 2, 
focusing on trials with a longer Predisplay duration (which was 200 ms in Exp.2 
and 400 ms in the present one). The result however did not reach statistical 









POMS results  
Paired comparisons were conducted to establish the degree to which the Mood 
Induction Procedure had been able to affect mood in the participants. The results 
of such t-tests showed significant differences between T1 and T2 (Mean POMS 
T1 vs. T2: 95.5 vs. 103; t(19) = -2.66, p = 0.01), suggesting that participants were 
successfully induced into a sad mood by the viewing of the movie clips. 
Specifically, a significant increase was observed in the Depression-Dejection and 
Tension-Anxiety subscales (Mean Depression-Dejection T1 vs. T2: 2.7 vs 4.6; 
t(19) = -2.54, p = 0.01; Mean Tension-Anxiety T1 vs. T2: 4.95 vs 7; t(19) = -2.39, p 
= 0.02) while, on the other hand, a significant decrease in the score of the Vigour 
subscale was found (Mean Vigour T1 vs. T2: 8.95 vs 6.4; t(19) = -3.12, p = 0.005), 
reflecting lower level of activity as participants became more sad. Importantly, no 
significant changes in the Fatigue subscale were registered (Mean Fatigue T1 vs. 
T2: 5.55 vs 4.75; t(19) = 1.41, p = 0.17), nor in Anger-Hostility and Confusion 
subscales (Mean Anger-Hostility T1 vs. T2: 2.2 vs 2.9; t(19) = -1.02, p = 0.31; 
Mean Confusion T1 vs. T2: 4.45 vs 3.9; t(19) = 0.89, p = 0.38).  
Interestingly, the comparison between the overall POMS scores at T2, 
immediately after Mood induction, and at T3, at the end of the entire experimental 
session, was also significant (Mean POMS T2 vs. T3: 103 vs. 111.75; t(19) = -3.04, 
p = 0.006), suggesting that participation in the experiment proper further affected 
mood in participants. Nevertheless, no differences were found in the Depression-
Dejection and Tension-Anxiety subscales (Mean Depression-Dejection T2 vs. T3: 
4.6 vs 4.3; t(19) = 0.33, p = 0.74; Mean Tension-Anxiety T2 vs. T3: 7 vs 5.65; t(19) 
= 1.65, p = 0.11), while a significant decrease in the Vigour subscale emerged 
(Mean Vigour T2 vs. T3: 6.4 vs 5.2; t(19) = 2.39, p = 0.02). Importantly, and in line 
with this result, a significant increase in the Fatigue subscale was found (Mean 
Fatigue T2 vs. T3: 4.75 vs 10.25; t(19) = -4.64, p < .001), as well as in the 
Confusion subscale (Mean Confusion T2 vs. T3: 3.9 vs 10.25; t(19) = -4.64, p < 
.001). Finally, no significant difference was found in the Anger-Hostility subscale 
(Mean Anger-Hostility T2 vs. T3: 2.9 vs 3.85; t(19) = -1.07, p = 0.29). These data 
suggested that while the relevant measures associated with sadness were 
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unchanged at the end of the experiment, the need for participants to implement 
cognitive strategies throughout the session in order to control and suppress their 
emotional responses led to a diminished level of energy and vigor which clearly 
reflected mental fatigue and confusion. 
 
9.3 Discussion 
It is widely demonstrated that emotional stimuli, even if task-irrelevant (Fox et al., 
2001), access attentional resources, becoming prioritized over other competing 
stimuli, probably because of their intrinsic significance (Vuilleumier, 2005). 
Specifically, several studies have demonstrated that negative emotional stimuli in 
particular elicit more prominent and rapid responses compared to neutral and 
positive ones (Hansen et al., 1988; Pratto et al., 1991, Carretiè et al., 2000). This 
“negativity bias” has been largely studied, and seems to involve different response 
systems, such as those related to cognitive, emotional and social behaviour 
(Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999; Mogg et al, 1998; Mogg et al., 2000; Peeters & 
Czapinsky, 1990; Taylor, 1991). Along these lines, it has been also proposed that, 
since they are so powerful in capturing and retaining attention, once detected 
negative stimuli require more attentional resources in order to be ignored and 
allow the processing of concurrent task-relevant information (Kern et al., 2005; 
Helton et al., 2011). In addition, the possibly threatening nature of these stimuli 
may also alter subjective mood and encourage more elaborate off-task processing 
(Smallwood et al., 2009; Smallwood, 2010). In line with this literature, in 
Experiment 2 indeed we demonstrated that stimuli with negative emotional 
content, compared to neutral and positive ones, impaired performance in a typical 
selective attention task, thus reflecting a greater interference on attentional 
processing mechanisms specifically involved in target selection and distraction 
filtering. Based on those results, we subsequently aimed to manipulate the degree 
to which the systematic processing of the images with negative valence was 
allowed during the course of the experiment. Conversely to Experiment 3, in 
which we wanted to reduce the impact of the images with negative valence, in 





generated after the presentation of each image by introducing a Mood Induction 
Procedure before the start of the experimental session, which is thought to 
enhance the processing of emotional information. Smallwood and colleagues 
(2009) showed higher level of task-unrelated thoughts after a mood induction 
procedure (Smallwood et al., 2009). When the mood induced has a negative 
effect, this seems to induce self-focused attention (Salovey, 1992; Sedikides, 
1992; Wood et al., 1990; Wood et al., 1990) and attention to somatic activity 
(Stegen et al., 2001). Helton and colleagues demonstrated that intrusive thoughts 
per se are correlated with decreased target detection performance (Helton & 
Warm, 2008). Therefore, we hypothesized that, when in a sad mood, participants 
could experience a larger amount of task-unrelated thoughts that, in order to be 
suppressed, would also compete with the primary task for access to attentional 
processing resources. The relationship between sad mood and negative emotional 
stimuli might therefore be bidirectional: the display of negative stimuli might 
induce sadness, and a sad mood might enhance the degree of processing of 
negative emotional stimuli (McVay & Kane, 2010; Smallwood, 2010). Based on 
this literature, we expected that, altogether, the larger consume of processing 
resources, also required in order to suppress task-unrelated thoughts, would 
interfere with the resources devoted to the suppression of emotional responses and 
distraction filtering which throughout the experimental session were also heavily 
engaged by the main task. 
Furthermore, it is known that, from an anatomical perspective, mood influences 
many of the brain region subserving memory, attention, perception and executive 
functions. In fact, these regions might become more or less active when 
experiencing a sad mood compared to a neutral one. Functional neuroimaging 
studies suggested that the anatomical bases of sad mood and of higher-order 
cognitive processing may be largely overlapping. Specifically, studies 
demonstrated that the activity of a common set of prefrontal and limbic brain 
regions is influenced by sad mood, among which dorsolateral (Aalto et al., 2002; 
Gemar et al., 1996; Liotti et al., 2000; Mayberg et al., 1999) and medial regions 
(for reviews, see Phan et al., 2002) of prefrontal cortex and the amygdala 
(Davidson et al., 2002; Mayberg, 1999; Murphy et al., 2003; Phan et al., 2002; 
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Philips M.L. et al., 2003a, 2003b; Aalto et al., 2002; Eugene et al., 2003; Lane et 
al., 1997; Levesque et al., 2003). Therefore, on the basis of this overlap in both 
cognitive and neural mechanisms involved in dealing with negative emotions and 
attentional filtering, we expected that by inducing sadness, and consequently 
increasing the affective engagement during exposure to negative emotional 
images, we would have observed increased costs in task performance and an 
accentuated depletion of attentional resources within the session.   
Differently from what we expected, in Experiment 4 we were not able to observe 
a significant depletion of attentional resources within the experimental session. 
Indeed, the Mood Induction Procedure, based on movie clips that we had 
collected, proved to be effective in inducing a sad mood. In fact, significantly 
higher levels of depression and tension were reported by subjects following the 
procedure, while, on the other hand, the levels of enthusiasm and general vivacity 
were lower. However, although participants were in a sad mood, the main results 
suggested that this manipulation was less powerful than we had anticipated, 
leading to non-significant effects. In fact, we could not demonstrate that, after the 
viewing of the movie clips, the emotional response engendered by the 
presentation of images with negative emotional content was emphasized. 
A close inspection of the data however seemed to indicate a trend in line with 
what emerged in Experiment 2, namely that as the session proceeded, the costs 
associated with distractor filtering increased, and especially so in trials with a 
longer Predisplay interval, which allowed a deeper processing of the negative 
valence images prior to stimulus display. While the results of Experiment 4 (i.e., 
in Image present trials, the interaction between Distractor presence, Block and 
Predisplay duration) failed to reach significance, a direct comparison between the 
linear regression coefficients of the function, describing how Distractor filtering 
cost was affected by Block in Experiment 2 and 4, suggested that the two did not 
differ significantly. Interestingly, in both cases the trend was quite the opposite to 
what had emerged in Experiment 3, which aimed on the contrary to reduce the 
impact of emotional images.  
There are a number of possible explanations for why the depletion of attentional 





may be found in a lack of statistical power, due to a relatively small sample size. 
Another possible explanation might be due to the individual features of the 
participants involved in this and all the Experiments in this study, which might 
have had a role in two different domains. In fact, they were all students at the 
Medical School, and presumably with particularly high cognitive skills and 
greater availability of cognitive resources. For this reason, it is possible that, with 
respect to the general population, these highly-performing subjects might be more 
resilient with respect to depletion of cognitive and attentional resources. 
Therefore, it is possible that if the same study were conducted on specific 
populations which are characterized by different levels of cognitive abilities or 
limited cognitive resources, such as anxious or depressed subjects, subjects with 
neuropsychological disorders or, simply, healthy older adults, the results obtained 
might have been quite different, and it will be interesting to investigate this 
possibility in future developments of this study.  
Moreover, in this Experiment, as well as in all those described as part of the 
study, interpersonal differences might have played a crucial role in modulating the 
overall sensitivity to the emotional stimuli, and, as a consequence, also their 
impact on attentional processing. In this Experiment in particular, our goal might 
have been additionally hindered by individual differences in the sensitivity to the 
Mood Induction Procedure. In order to explore this possibility, we selected four 
participants from our sample, the two subjects that showed the highest and the 
lowest score respectively at POMS questionnaire, which indexes the sensitivity to 
the Mood Induction Procedure, or how strongly the viewing of negatively valued 
emotional movie clips induced a sad mood. Interestingly, we could observe 
substantial differences in their performance during the main task, suggesting that 
they were differently affected by the negative mood and the negative content of 




                              
          
Fig.4. A. Interaction between POMS score and cost of distractor in individuals with extreme 
values. B. Interaction between median split POMS score and cost of distractor in all sample. 
 
As shown in figure 4 panel a, participants who scored higher at POMS, thus 
reflecting the highest level of induced sad mood, showed a systematic increase in 
the cost of distractor filtering over the experimental session, perfectly in line with 
the expected results. Conversely, participants who scored lower at the POMS, and 
therefore were not affected by the negative mood induction and perhaps were also 
less sensitive to the negative emotional effects engendered by the images, showed 
no variations in the cost of distractor filtering over time. In order to explore more 
systematically the impact of such individual differences we carried out a new 
ANOVA, with the same within-subjects factors considered in the main data 
analyses, in which the sample was divided in two subsets, according to a median 
split of POMS scores. Although the data were in line with those observed in 
individuals with extreme values (Fig.4 panel b) none of the effects reached 
statistical significance, perhaps because of the limited size of our sample (overall 
20 subjects, 10 per POMS group).  
This preliminary evidence however suggests that individual differences in the 
permeability of one’s mood with respect to external stimuli with an emotional 
content might be crucial in supporting the results at the core of this investigation. 
While a substantial depletion of attentional resources over time is found in 






presumably make a stronger effort to counteract the impact of these images during 
the course of the experimental session, subjects who are less permeable to these 















The scope of this work has been that of directly exploring whether it is possible to 
deplete – in a relatively short period of time – a specific pool of cognitive 
resources dedicated to visual selective attention. To this aim, we performed a 
series of visual selective attention experiments based on an Attentional Capture 
task (Theeuwes, 1994), in which subjects had to detect and discriminate a target 
that could be accompanied by a salient irrelevant distractor. In order to give rise to 
a heavy and persistent condition of distraction we introduced a crucial 
manipulation, which posed great stress by overloading attentional mechanisms. 
Prior to the display of task relevant information we introduced images with a high 
emotional content since they are known to be powerful in attracting and holding 
attention even when they are irrelevant, such as in this case (Hodsoll et al., 2011; 
Yiend, 2010). Subjects were instructed to focus their attention on the main task, 
while ignoring both the emotional images and the response that they might have 
engendered, as well as the salient distractor when it was present in the trial.  
In Experiment 1, we firstly demonstrated the efficacy of our paradigm in giving 
rise to attentional capture (Theeuwes, 2004) within a very cognitively demanding 
task, which aimed at posing a great stress on attentional resources. By dividing the 
entire timeline of the experimental session in consecutive blocks, we could 
monitor any changes in performance and in attentional capture over time. 
However, differently from what we might have expected, we could not observe 
any sign of depletion. Despite all the manipulations applied in order to overload 
the attentional system, performance seemed to improve over time, suggesting, in 
line with previous studies, that attentional processing – including distractor 
filtering – can improve over time with practice (Kelley & Yantis, 2009; Turatto & 
Pascucci, 2016). Regarding the impact of emotional images, we could 
demonstrate that they indeed exerted a detrimental influence on attentional 
processing. In particular, greater cost in distractor filtering performance was found 
in association with images with negative emotional content. However, also the 
overall interference produced by the images became weaker toward the end of the 
session. It is plausible to think that subjects became better capable in managing 
the emotional responses engendered by the images over time. One possible reason 
could be that in this Experiment each image was repeated four times during the 
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session and, therefore, subjects might have become familiar with their content, 
and this could have contributed to decrease their arousing effect over time. 
Another complexity arose from the fact that all images (negative and positive) 
were intermixed during the session. Therefore, if any detrimental effects were 
triggered by the negative images, the subsequent processing of an image with 
positive valence might have helped “restore” any disruption, and/or vice versa 
(Helton & Russell, 2011), since several studies demonstrated the beneficial effects 
of natural scenarios on attention and memory, and, more generally, on cognition 
(Berman, et al., 2008; Berto, 2005; Cimprich & Ronis, 2003; Faber, Taylor, Kuo, 
& Sullivan, 2002; Hartig et al., 2003; Tennessen & Cimprich, 1995).  
To overcome these issues, we designed another experiment, Experiment 2, in 
order to explore more directly the impact exerted by the images on attentional 
mechanisms. Two main variations were introduced with respect to the method of 
Experiment 1. Firstly, the emotional valence of the images displayed on each trial 
was manipulated as a between-subjects factor and, thus, each group of subjects 
was exposed to images of only one valence (positive, negative or neutral). 
Second, we increased the set size of the emotional images, so that each one of 
them was displayed only once. Again, results of Experiment 2 confirmed an 
attentional capture effect since the capture by the salient distractor disrupted the 
ongoing task. More importantly and more interestingly, we demonstrated that the 
attentional mechanisms involved in distraction filtering were affected differently 
by the different emotional content of the images. The presence of the image was 
always detrimental for task performance. Additionally, negative and positive 
images had an opposite effect on the ongoing attentional processing, with only 
negative images leading to a significant increase of attentional capture with time 
on task. This result was not only in line with previous studies that claimed that 
emotional stimuli, even if task-irrelevant, capture attention, thus disrupting the 
ongoing task (Hodsoll, et al., 2011; Yiend, 2010), but also with the evidence of a 
stronger bias toward negative stimuli. According to this perspective, negative 
stimuli elicit more rapid and prominent responses than do positive and neutral 
ones, because of their higher relevance for evolutionary purposes (Armony & 





Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Mogg, 2000; Baumeister, et al., 2001; Cacioppo & 
Gardner, 1999; Taylor, 1991). In addition, it has been shown that negative 
emotional stimuli compete heavily for attentional resources as they appear to 
capture and retain attention (Kern, 2005, Helton et al., 2011). In line with this 
literature, we indeed could assist to a depletion of attentional resources in a very 
short period of time, i.e. one-hour session, only in the group with negative valence 
images. In contrast, an improvement in performance was registered in the groups 
to witch neutral and positive images were shown at the start of each trial. 
Moreover, based on previous studies which claimed the beneficial influence of 
natural scenarios on cognition, we indeed could observe a greater reduction of 
attentional capture cost in the group with positive images since many images of 
our positive sample represented natural scenes (Berman, et al., 2008; Berto, 2005; 
Cimprich & Ronis, 2003; Faber, Taylor, Kuo, & Sullivan, 2002; Hartig et al., 
2003; Tennessen & Cimprich, 1995). Interestingly, by analysing performance to 
the small proportion of trials that were not preceded by emotional images in each 
group (20% of the total trials) we could observe differences across groups that 
were in line with those found in image-present trials. We hypothesise that these 
effects might be due to the prolonged exposure to emotional stimuli during the 
whole experimental session, which gave rise to an emotional context, which 
extended and amplified the impact of the emotional images shown. Importantly, 
all of these effects emerged more markedly in trials with a longer Predisplay 
interval, which intervened between the offset of the image and the onset of the 
task relevant stimuli, and therefore allowed for a deeper processing of the images 
prior to task performance.  
The results of Experiment 2 suggested that emotional negative stimuli indeed 
exerted a detrimental effect on attentional resources, and following this evidence 
we asked whether such effects could vary according to the degree to which the 
processing of the emotional contents of stimuli is allowed by the experimental 
context. We set out two further experiments with the aim on the one hand to 
replicate the general context of the Negative image condition of Experiment 2, 
and, on the other hand, to either reduce (Experiment 3) or increase (Experiment 4) 
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the degree to which the systematic processing of the negative images was allowed 
during the course of experiment.   
In Experiment 2 we found that the impact of negative emotional images on the 
depletion of attentional resources was maximum when more time (i.e. 200 ms) 
was allowed for the processing of emotional information. Therefore, in the 
subsequent experiments we decided to display only negative emotional images 
and to increase the “long” Predisplay  so that it could vary between 100 or 400 
ms. This created a larger temporal gap which allowed, in trials with a long 
Predisplay duration, a greater opportunity for the emotional contents to exert their 
influence on attentional mechanisms and determine a greater consumption of 
attentional resources.  
Starting from this premise, Experiment 3 was designed in order to reduce the 
detrimental effects that negative emotional stimuli exerted on attentional 
mechanisms. To this aim, a secondary working memory task was introduced and 
was to be performed in parallel to the main task. Indeed, contrary to what found in 
the Negative image condition of Experiment 2, the attentional capture effect was 
constant throughout the experimental session, even in the longer Predisplay 
duration. This finding suggested that the secondary task might have facilitated the 
processing of task-related stimuli while avoiding the interfering emotional effects 
by the consistent engagement of top-down mechanisms. A viable explanation for 
such protective effect might be due to the involvement of medial prefrontal 
cortex, which is known to play a role in cognitive regulation of emotional 
responses (Davidson, 2000; Ochsner & Gross, 2005) and for exerting a top-down 
inhibitory effect on the amygdala (Pears et al., 2003; Rosenkranz et al., 2005; 
Izquierdo & Murray, 2005; Quirk and Beer, 2006; Carmichael & Price, 1995; 
McDonald et al., 1996). In fact, many studies reported an attenuated amygdala 
reactivity to emotional stimuli during emotion regulation, associated with an 
increased activation of prefrontal brain regions (Ochsner & Gross, 2005). Thus, 
with Experiment 3 we indeed observed an effective reduction of the impact that 
negative emotional stimuli exert on attentional mechanisms. It is plausible to 
think that in these circumstances their emotional content could not be processed in 





Conversely, Experiment 4 was set out in order to emphasize the processing of the 
emotional contents of negative images in order to observe strongly disruptive 
effects on the deployment of attentional processing resources. As already 
discussed, previous studies suggested that the exposure to negative emotional 
stimuli might consume attentional resources and lead to performance costs since, 
by altering subjective mood, they encourage concurrent task-unrelated thoughts 
that compete with the primary task for access to attentional processing resources 
in order to be suppressed (Smallwood et al., 2007; Smallwood et al., 2009; 
Smallwood, 2010; Farrin et al., 2003; Watts et al., 1988). Accordingly, fMRI 
studies have reported a large overlap between areas involved in the experience of 
sad mood and executive functions (Davidson et al., 2002; Mayberg et al., 1999). 
Based on the this evidence of overlapping substrates, and given the interaction 
between sad mood and cognitive performance, we expected that by inducing a sad 
mood in our participants, we might enhance the detrimental influence of negative 
emotional images on attentional processing and the depletion of the associated 
cognitive resources. To this aim, we introduced a Mood Induction Procedure 
before the start of the experimental session. Although we observed a significant 
induction of a sad mood in our participants to Experiment 4, we could not observe 
a significant depletion of attentional resources within the experimental session. 
Although the attentional capture effect did not become lower with increasing time 
on task, neither did it become significantly higher at the end of the session. 
Overall, the effects of the mood manipulation seemed less powerful than we had 
anticipated, leading to non-statistically significant effects. However, a close 
inspection of the data seemed to indicate a trend in line to what emerged in 
Experiment 2, and in particular, the cost associated with distractor filtering did 
increase numerically throughout the experimental session, and especially so in 
trials in which a negative image was present and with a longer Predisplay 
duration. A direct comparison between the functions describing how attentional 
capture effects changed with time on task suggested that the trends of Experiment 
2 and 4 were similar to each other and both quite the opposite of Experiment 3, 
which indeed aimed to reduce the impact of emotional images.  
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We must acknowledge that this evidence is based on a qualitative assessment of 
the results. Nonetheless, there are a number of possible explanations for why 
these findings were not supported also by statistical significance. Firstly, the 
relatively small sample size considered in our experiments could have reduced the 
statistical power of the study. Another possible reason might be ascribed to the 
individual features of our participants, since they were all students of the Medical 
School and presumably high-performing subjects with a greater-than-average 
availability of cognitive resources. Therefore, it would be interesting to conduct 
the same study on different populations, with different levels of cognitive abilities 
or limited cognitive resources, such as depressed or anxious subjects, subjects 
with neuropsychological disorders, or, simply, healthy older adults. In these 
samples we would expect to observe clearer signs of depletion of attentional 
resources, which might also become evident earlier within the session. 
In conclusion, the findings collected with this work offer new evidence relative to 
the depletion of cognitive resources specifically associated with selective 
attention. Differently from mental fatigue, which reflects the depletion of general 
cognitive resources after a long time on task (i.e. 3-4 hours), we demonstrated that 
these domain-specific resources can be depleted in a relatively short period of 
time (i.e. one-hour session).  
Our findings provide new evidence in line with previous results showing that 
emotional activation can either enhance or impair cognitive performance, as a 
function of the emotional valence of the stimuli involved, with negative emotions 
leading to detrimental effects (Experiments 1, 2 and 4), and positive emotions 
leading to opposite, restorative effects on cognitive resources (Experiments 1, and 
2). 
Last, but not least, our results also provide fundamental evidence on the fact that 
under conditions of high load on attentional processing, the active engagement of 
top-down behavioural control may limit, or even abolish, the detrimental effects 














A. Results of the analysis on Reaction Times of Experiment 2 
Image present trials 
RTs of correct responses on the 80% of trials in which the images were displayed 
were entered into a mixed effect ANOVA including Valence (neutral, positive and 
negative) as a between subject factor, and Distractor Presence (present or absent), 
Block (1-4), and Predisplay duration (100 or 200 ms) as within-subject factors. 
 
                            
 
                     
Fig.1 Image present trials analysis: Main effects. A. Main effect of Distractor Presence. B. 








The ANOVA revealed a main effect of Distractor Presence, F(1, 57)= 555.96, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .907, with faster RTs in the Distractor-absent condition compared to 
the Distractor-present condition (484.08 ms vs. 534.73 ms), thus reflecting 
attentional capture (Fig.1 panel a). The main effect of Block was also significant, 
F(3, 171)= 21.26, p < .001, ηp2 = .364, revealing faster RTs toward the end of the 
session (Fig.1 panel b). The main effect of Predisplay duration was also 
significant, F(1, 57)= 315.38, p < .001, ηp2 = .846, with RTs being overall faster in 
the longer Predisplay interval (521.71 ms vs. 497.09 ms) (Fig.1 panel c). 
 
                              
 








          
 
Fig.2 Image present trials analysis: Interactions between factors. A. Image Valence as 
function of Block. B. Distractor Presence as function of Block. C. Distractor Presence as a 
function of Predisplay duration. D. Predisplay duration as function of Block. E. Cost of 
Distractor as a function of Image Valence, Block and Predisplay duration. 
 
Interestingly, the interaction between Valence and Block was significant, F(6, 171)= 
3.05, p = 0.007, ηp2 = .066, suggesting that although RTs improved across 
consecutive blocks in all of the three groups (mean RTs by Block: Neutral 
Valence, Block 1 = 508.97 ms, Block 2 = 503.28 ms, Block 3 = 501.10 ms, Block 
4 = 494.25 ms; Positive Valence, Block 1 = 512.52 ms, Block 2 = 503.07 ms, 
Block 3 = 501.19 ms, Block 4 = 497.13 ms; Negative Valence, Block 1 = 546.52 
ms, Block 2 = 523.11 ms, Block 3 = 514.90 ms, Block 4 = 506.82 ms), this effect 
was more marked for the group with Negative Valence images, which showed a 
greater decrease in RTs across blocks (Neutral Valence, Block 1 vs. Block 2: t(79)= 
1.80, p = 0.07, Block 2 vs. Block 3:  t(79)= 0.9, p = 0.36, Block 3 vs. Block 4: 
 t(79)= 2.95, p = 0.004; Positive Valence, Block 1 vs. Block 2:  t(79)= 2.70, p = 
0.008, Block 2 vs. Block 3:  t(79)= 0.98, p = 0.32, Block 3 vs. Block 4:  t(79)= 1.82, 
p = 0.07; Negative Valence, Block 1 vs. Block 2: t(79)= 9.34, p < .001, Block 2 vs. 
Block 3:  t(79)= 4.25, p < .001, Block 3 vs. Block 4 : t(79)= 4.86, p < .001) (Fig.2 
panel a). The interaction between Block and Distractor Presence was also 
significant, F(3, 171)= 6.18, p < .001, ηp2 = .224 (Fig.2 panel b). RTs were 






Distractor-absent condition in all of the four Blocks (Distractor-present vs. 
Distractor-absent, Block 1: t(119)= -24.50, p < .001; Block 2: t(119)= -26.78, p < 
.001; Block 3: t(119)= -24.93, p < .001; Block 4: t(119)= -25.45, p < .001). However, 
the cost associated with Distractor presence was significantly different between 
Blocks. In fact, a significant decrease in distractor cost was observed only 
between Blocks 2 and 3 (Difference in cost of Distractor, Block 1 vs. Block 2: 
54.83 ms vs. 52.38 ms, t(119)= -1.15, p = 0.24; Block 2 vs. Block 3: 52.38 ms vs. 
48.53 ms, t(119)= -2.04, p = 0.04; Block 3 vs. Block 4: 48.53 ms vs. 46.87 ms, 
t(119)= 0.82, p = 0.41). The interaction between Distractor and Predisplay duration 
was marginally significant, F(1, 57)= 3, p = 0.08, ηp2 = .050 (Fig.2 panel c). 
Although in both the Distractor-present and absent trials RTs were faster in the 
longer predisplay interval (100 ms vs. 200 ms Predisplay duration, Distractor-
present trials: t(239)= 19.64, p < .001; Distractor-absent trials: t(239)= 23.23, p < 
.001), the cost due to the presence of distractor was slightly higher in trial with a 
longer Prediplay duration (Distractor-present vs. Distractor-absent difference, 
with 100 ms Predisplay duration, 49.48 ms, vs. 200 ms Predisplay duration, 51.82 
ms; t(239)= -1.68, p = 0.09). Also the interaction between Predisplay and Block was 
significant, F(3, 171)= 11.33, p < .001, ηp2 = .326, suggesting that although the 
difference between the two Predisplay conditions was significant in all blocks,  
(Trial with 100 ms vs. 200 ms Predisplay duration, Block 1: t(119)= 17.93, p < 
.001, Block 2: t(119)= 15.63, p < .001, Block 3: t(119)= 13.34, p < .001, Block 4: 
 t(119)= 14.51, p < .001), it was significantly greater in Block 1 with respect to all 
the others (difference between predisplay 100 and 200, Block 1 vs. Block 2: t(119)= 
3.00, p = 0.003, Block 2 vs. Block 3: t(119)= 1.48, p = 0.14, Block 3 vs. Block 4: 
t(119)= 0.47, p = 0.63) (Fig.2 panel d). Interestingly, the 4-way interaction between 
Valence, Distractor, Block and Predisplay was also significant, F(6, 171)= 2.35, p = 
0.03, ηp2 = .097 (Fig.2 panel e). To better understand this interaction, we 
performed two separate ANOVAs, analyzing separately trials with different 
Predisplay durations. In these analyses we focused on the interaction between 
Valence, Distractor and Block, which would provide crucial results with respect 
to our aims. This interaction however did not reach statistical significance in 
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either Predisplay duration (Predisplay 100 ms, F(6, 171)= 1.69, p = 0.12; Predisplay 
200 ms ms, F(6, 171)= 1.22, p = 0.29). 
 
Image absent trials 
Another repeated measures ANOVA was carried out on the remaining 20% of 
trials, in which, instead of the images with emotional content, a colored noise 
display was presented. We considered Valence (neutral, positive, and negative) as 
a between-subjects factor, Distractor Presence (present or absent), Block (1-4) and 
Predisplay duration (100 or 200 ms) as within-subjects factors.  
 
                        







Fig.3 Image absent trials analysis: Main effects. A. Main effect of Distractor Presence. B. 
Main effect of Block. C. Main effect of Predisplay duration. 
 
 
The ANOVA revealed, in line with the previous analysis, a significant main effect 
of Distractor Presence, F(1, 57)= 504.86, p < .001, ηp2 = .898 (Fig.3 panel a). The 
salient distractor indeed interfered with the task at hand, thus reflecting again an 
attentional capture effect (482.68 ms vs. 528.30). The main effect of Block was 
also significant, F(3, 171)= 20.91, p < .001, ηp2 = .368, revealing that RTs were 
faster towards the end of the session (Fig.3 panel b). Also the main effect of 
Predisplay duration was significant, F(1, 57)= 91.09, p < .001, ηp2 = .615, showing 
faster RTs in the longer predisplay interval compared to the shorter one (514.50 
ms vs. 496.49 ms) (Fig.3 panel c).  
 
                              
 
Fig.4 Image absent trials analysis: Interactions between factors. A. Distractor Presence as 
function of Predisplay duration. B. Predisplay duration as function of Block.  
 
The interaction between Distractor Presence and Predisplay duration was 
significant, F(1, 57)= 4.74, p = 0.03, ηp2 = .076 (Fig.4 panel a). Post-hoc t-tests 
revealed that although the cost due to Distractor presence was significant in both 
Predisplay duration conditions (Distractor present vs. absent, Predisplay 100 ms: 




significantly  higher in the longer Predisplay interval (Distractor-present vs. 
Distractor-absent, Predisplay 100 ms, 42.56 ms, vs. Predisplay 200 ms, 48.67 ms; 
t(239)= -2.28, p = 0.02). Moreover, also the interaction between Block and 
Predisplay reached statistical significance, F(3, 171)= 5.74, p < .001 (Fig.4 panel b). 
RTs were overall slower in the shorter Predisplay condition (100 ms Predisplay 
duration, Block 1 = 534.42 ms, Block 2 = 513.88 ms, Block 3 = 507.08, Block 4 = 
502.63; 200 ms Predisplay duration, Block 1 = 506.69 ms, Block 2 = 497.52 ms, 
Block 3 = 494.93 ms, Block 4 = 486.80 ms). In this condition however they 
showed a great improvement across Blocks (100 ms Predisplay duration, Block 1 
vs. Block 2: t(119)= 5.96, p < .001, Block 2 vs. Block 3: t(119)= 2.32, p < .001, 
Block 3 vs. Block 4: t(119)= 1.76, p < .001; 200 ms Predisplay duration, Block 1 
vs. Block 2: t(119)= 2.40, p = 0.03, Block 2 vs. Block 3: t(119)= 0.86, p = 0.38, 
Block 3 vs. Block 4: t(119)= 2.65, p = 0.02) especially in Block 1 (difference 
between predisplay 100 and 200, Block 1 vs. Block 2: t(119)= 2.65, p = 0.008, 







B. Results of the analysis on Reaction Times of Experiment 3 
Image present trials 
A repeated measures ANOVA was performed on the RTs of responses in the 80% 
of the trials in which the images were displayed. The factors included, all within 
subjects, were Distractor Presence (present or absent), Block (1-4) and Predisplay 
duration (100 or 400 ms).  
 
                              
 
                              
Fig.1 Image present trials analysis. A. Main effect of Distractor Presence. B. Main effect of 






The ANOVA yielded a significant main effect of Distractor presence, F(1, 19)= 
202.86, p < .001, ηp2 = .914, reflecting the attentional capture effect with faster 
RTs in the Distractor-absent condition (498.01 ms vs. 539.56 ms) (Fig.1 panel a). 
The main effect of Block was also significant, F(3, 57)= 10.80, p < .001, ηp2 = .504, 
in fact RTs became faster throughout the session (Fig.1 panel b). Also the main 
effect of Prediplay duration was statistically significant, F(1, 19)= 79.34, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .806 (Fig.1 panel c). RTs were significantly slower in the shorter Predisplay 
duration (538.56 ms vs. 499.02 ms). The interaction between Block and 
Predisplay duration was significant as well, F(3, 57)= 11.47, p < .001, ηp2 = .580 
(Fig.1 panel d). While RTs were always significantly slower in the shorter 
Predisplay duration (100 ms Predisplay duration, Block 1 = 565.40 ms, Block 2 = 
533.63 ms, Block 3 = 527.57, Block 4 = 527.62; 400 ms Predisplay duration, 
Block 1 = 510.09 ms, Block 2 = 498.99 ms, Block 3 = 493.70 ms, Block 4 = 
493.28 ms), the improvement across blocks was particularly marked in this 
condition (100 ms Predisplay duration, Block 1 vs. Block 2: t(39)= 7.03, p < .001, 
Block 2 vs. Block 3: t(39)= 1.82, p = 0.07, Block 3 vs. Block 4: t(39)= -0.01, p = 
0.98; 400 ms Predisplay duration, Block 1 vs. Block 2: t(39)= 2.59, p = 0.03, Block 
2 vs. Block 3: t(39)= 1.52, p = 0.27, Block 3 vs. Block 4: t(39)= 0.13, p = 0.89), 
especially in Block 1 (difference between predisplay 100 and 200, Block 1 vs. 
Block 2: t(39)= 4.79, p < .001, Block 2 vs. Block 3: t(39)= 0.20, p = 0.83, Block 3 
vs. Block 4: t(39)= -0.15, p = 0.87). 
 
 
Image absent trials 
As usual, a repeated measures ANOVA was also performed on the RTs of 
responses in the 20% of the trials, in which the images were not shown, and 
replaced by colored noise. The factors included were Distractor Presence (present 






                              
 
                              
 
Fig.2 Image absent trials analysis. A. Main effect of Distractor Presence. B. Main effect of 
Block. C. Main effect of Predisplay duration. D. Predisplay duration as function of Block. 
 
 
The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Distractor presence, F(1, 
19)=108.08, p < .001, ηp2 = .851, confirming the attentional capture effect (493.91 
ms vs. 534.74 ms) (Fig.2 panel a). The main effects of Block, F(3, 57)=16.50, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .537, and Predisplay duration, F(1, 19)=51.48, p < .001, ηp2 = .731, 
were also significant, reflecting faster RTs towards the end of the session (Fig.2 
panel b) and significantly faster RTs in the longer Predisplay duration (528.10 ms 





and Predisplay duration was significant, F(3, 57)=7.35, p < .001, ηp2 = .446 (Fig.2 
panel d). In line with the previous analysis, RTs were slower in the shorter 
Predisplay duration in all of the four Blocks (100 ms Predisplay duration, Block 1 
= 563.94 ms, Block 2 = 527.18 ms, Block 3 = 510.61, Block 4 = 510.68; 400 ms 
Predisplay duration, Block 1 = 515.73 ms, Block 2 = 498.26 ms, Block 3 = 495.77 
ms, Block 4 = 492.44 ms). Again, RTs became faster in both Predisplay 
conditions, but the effect of Block was more marked for trials with a shorter 
Predisplay (100 ms Predisplay duration, Block 1 vs. Block 2: t(39)= 5.20, p < .001, 
Block 2 vs. Block 3: t(39)= 3.72, p < .001, Block 3 vs. Block 4: t(39)= -0.01, p = 
0.98; 400 ms Predisplay duration, Block 1 vs. Block 2: t(39)= 2.39, p = 0.02, Block 
2 vs. Block 3: t(39)= 0.41, p = 0.68, Block 3 vs. Block 4: t(39)= 0.68, p = 0.49). 
Moreover, the difference between the two Predisplay conditions was significantly 
greater in Block 1 with respect to all the others (difference between predisplay 
100 and 200, Block 1 vs. Block 2: t(39)= 2.03, p = 0.04, Block 2 vs. Block 3: t(39)= 






C. Results of the analysis on Reaction Times of Experiment 4 
Image present trials 
A repeated measures ANOVA was carried out on the RTs of responses in the 80% 
of the trials, in which the images were displayed. The factors included were 
Distractor Presence (present or absent), Block (1-4) and Predisplay duration (100 
or 400 ms).  
 
                                   
         
Fig.1 Image present trials analysis: Main effects. A. Main effect of Distractor Presence. B. 






The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Distractor presence, F(1, 19)= 
281.55, p < .001, ηp2 = .936, suggesting that the distractor interfered with the task 
at hand, reflecting again attentional capture effect (502.97 ms vs. 554.79 ms) 
(Fig.1 panel a). Results showed also a main effect of Block, F(3, 57)= 9.84, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .421, since RTs were faster towards the end of the session (Fig.1 
panel b). A main effect of Predisplay duration was found as well, F(1, 19)= 53.66, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .738, reflecting, in line with the previous analysis, shorter RTs in 
the longer Predisplay duration (546.40 ms vs. 511.37 ms) (Fig.1 panel c).  
 
                                     
 
Fig.2 Image present trials analysis: Interaction effects. A. Distractor Presence as function of 
Block. B. Predisplay duration as function of Block. 
 
The interaction between Distractor Presence and Block was significant, F(3, 57)= 
4.58, p = 0.006, ηp2 = .398 (Fig.2 panel a). RTs were significantly slower in the 
Distractor-present condition compared to the Distractor-absent condition in all of 
the four Blocks (Distractor-present vs. Distractor-absent, Block 1: t(39)= -16.35, p 
< .001; Block 2: t(39)= -18.48, p < .001; Block 3: t(39)= -13.07, p < .001; Block 4: 
t(39)= -14.76, p < .001). However, the cost associated with Distractor presence was 
significantly modulated by Block. In fact, a significant decrease in distractor cost 
was found only between Block 1 and 2 (Cost of Distractor, Block 1 vs. Block 2: 






49.05 ms, t(39)= 0.26, p = 0.79; Block 3 vs. Block 4: 49.05 ms vs. 48.03 ms, t(39)= 
0.23, p = 0.81) . Also the interaction between Block and Predisplay was 
significant, F(3, 57)= 8.06, p < .001, ηp2 = .543 (Fig.2 panel b). RTs were slower in 
the shorter Predisplay duration in all of the four Blocks (100 ms Predisplay 
duration, Block 1 = 571.39 ms, Block 2 = 554.14 ms, Block 3 = 536.22, Block 4 = 
532.83; 400 ms Predisplay duration, Block 1 = 526.67 ms, Block 2 = 507.73 ms, 
Block 3 = 505.39 ms, Block 4 = 505.67 ms) and the difference between the two 
Predisplay conditions was constant throughout the session (difference between 
predisplay 100 and 200, Block 1 vs. Block 2: t(39)= 1.80, p = 0.07, Block 2 vs. 
Block 3: t(39)= 1.61, p = 0.11, Block 3 vs. Block 4: t(39)= 1.01, p = 0.31). Again, in 
line with the previous analysis, RTs became faster across Blocks in both 
Predisplay conditions, but the effect was especially marked for trials with a 
shorter Predisplay duration (100 ms Predisplay duration, Block 1 vs. Block 2: 
t(39)= 5.16, p < .001, Block 2 vs. Block 3: t(39)= 2.54 p = 0.01, Block 3 vs. Block 4: 
t(39)= 0.93, p = 0.35; 400 ms Predisplay duration, Block 1 vs. Block 2: t(39)= 0.64, 
p < .001, Block 2 vs. Block 3: t(39)= 0.64, p = 0.52, Block 3 vs. Block 4: t(39)= -
0.07, p = 0.94).  
 
 
Image absent trials 
In line with the other analysis, a repeated measures ANOVA was performed on 
the RTs of responses in the 20% of the trials, in which the images were not 
displayed. The factors included were Distractor Presence (present or absent), 




                             
 
                           
 
Fig.3 Image absent trials analysis. A. Main effect of Distractor Presence. B. Main effect of 
Block. C. Main effect of Predisplay duration. D. Distractor Presence as function of Block.  
 
The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Distractor presence, F(1, 19)= 
329.68, p < .001, ηp2 = .945, reflecting again the attentional capture effect 
(495.08 ms vs. 545.72 ms) (Fig.3 panel a). The main effect of Block was also 
significant, F(3, 57)= 11.31, p < .001, ηp2 =  .536 (Fig.3 panel b). RTs, in fact, were 
faster towards the end of the session. The main effect of Predisplay duration was 
also significant, F(3, 19)= 23.85, p < .001, ηp2 = .556, reflecting slower RTs in the 
shorter Predisplay duration (529.87 ms vs. 510.93 ms) (Fig.3 panel c). Again, the 







ηp2 = .404, suggesting that although RTs were slower in the shorter Predisplay 
duration in all of the four Blocks (100 ms Predisplay duration, Block 1 = 560.16 
ms, Block 2 = 528.64 ms, Block 3 = 515.20, Block 4 = 515.48; 400 ms Predisplay 
duration, Block 1 = 523.52 ms, Block 2 = 509.58 ms, Block 3 = 505.40 ms, Block 
4 = 505.23 ms), the RT reduction was more evident for trials with a shorter 
Predisplay (100 ms Predisplay duration, Block 1 vs. Block 2: t(39)= 4.89, p < .001, 
Block 2 vs. Block 3: t(39)= 2.31 p = 0.02, Block 3 vs. Block 4: t(39)= -0.05, p = 
0.95; 400 ms Predisplay duration, Block 1 vs. Block 2: t(39)= 2.66, p = 0.01, Block 
2 vs. Block 3: t(39)= 0.92, p = 0.36, Block 3 vs. Block 4: t(39)= 0.03, p = 0.97). 
Moreover, the difference between the two Predisplay conditions was significantly 
greater in Block 1 (difference between predisplay 100 and 200, Block 1 vs. Block 
2: t(39)= 2.57, p = 0.01, Block 2 vs. Block 3: t(39)= 1.55, p = 0.12, Block 3 vs. 





As already explained in the main text discussing Experiment 2, the main effects of 
the manipulations at the core of our research interest were crucially revealed by 
response accuracy. In none of the analyses of RTs were we able to observe a 
significant modulation of the performance costs due to distractor presence, as a 
function of either Valence (when it was a factor), Predisplay duration and Block. 
If anything, we found a systematic, paramount improvement in response speed 
across all Experiments and conditions, merely reflecting the beneficial impact of 
practice with the task at hand. The combined impact of emotional images and time 
on task (further modulated by Predisplay duration) on attentional filtering (i.e., the 
effect of Distractor presence) was only detectable in accuracy rates. This finding 
might be explained by the fact that the paradigm required very speeded responses 
in order to meet a very close deadline, and the massive top-down control on task 
responses needed to provide such fast responses did not allow space to express 
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